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Abstract
This research asked the following question: is there a correlation between types
of organizational culture and factors influencing knowledge transfer? It hypothesized
that organizations scoring high on the cultural factors of openness to change/innovation,
and task-oriented organizational growth would be fertile to knowledge transfer. Second,
it hypothesized that organizations scoring high on the factors of bureaucratic and
competition/confrontation would be infertile to knowledge transfer.
The research looked at Air Force squadrons, surveying a representative sample of
the 1,495 active-duty squadrons included in the study with a 62- item, 5-point Likert-type
instrument. Overall, 51 squadrons were surveyed, and 22 produced usable results. Both
squadron and individual results were analyzed—and both were similar.
Squadron results showed that organizations scoring high on the factors of
openness to change/innovation and task-oriented organizational growth appeared to score
consistently high on three of the four measures of fertility to knowledge transfer.
Organizations scoring high on the factors of competition/confrontation appeared to score
consistently low on three of the four measures of fertility to knowledge transfer. The
factor bureaucratic produced no significant correlations. In every case, the measure of
fertility to knowledge transfer known as partner similarity did not behave as expected.
The research concluded that there appears to be a correlation between
organizational culture and factors influencing the transfer of knowledge, but concludes
that the factors influencing the transfer of knowledge should be further explored, and a
longitudinal study performed, befo re inferring any causal relationship.

xii

AN INVESTIGATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE
KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER IN THE AIR FORCE

I. Introduction
One might make the claim that an organization’s knowledge is one of its most
important resources. In fact, numerous authors have pointed to knowledge as an
organization’s best sustainable source of competitive advantage (Drucker 1988; Nonaka,
1991; Morey and Frangioso, 1997; Zwass, 1999; Argote and Ingram, 2000; Argote,
Ingram, Levine, and Moreland, 2000; Davenport and Prusak, 2000; Lahti and Beyerlein,
2000; Rulke, Zaheer and Anderson, 2000). Recent academic and popular media attention
on organizational knowledge creation, capture, and transfer attest to a widespread
acceptance of this idea (Costa, 1999; Davenport, DeLong, and Beers, 1998; Marchand
and Davenport, 2000).
If knowledge is indeed as important as some argue it is, perhaps an organization
might wish to increase its use of the knowledge it already possesses. One interim step
towards realizing this goal is to identify factors that encourage or discourage knowledge
transfer in organizations, and explain their interactions. Once knowledge transfer is
understood in the context of an organization, managers may begin to better plan to
increase the use of knowledge in their organizations.
Background
Recently, with the realization of the importance of “knowledge organizations,”
and “learning organizations,” organizations have begun looking at how to increase
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organizational knowledge to gain a strategic advantage (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995;
Bresman, Birkinshaw, and Nobel, 1999; Davenport and Prusak 2000). Thus far, interest
has centered on knowledge creation and codification, primarily for two reasons. First, the
idea that a competitive advantage stems from new inventions and innovations has led to
interest in knowledge creation (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). Second, a recently
competitive job market for technology professionals coupled with an aging technical
workforce has led to numerous attempts to codify and capture knowledge before it leaves
an organization in the minds of the employees (Rueve, 2000).
In these regards, the Air Force is no different from its civilian counterparts. Not
only must it fill numerous technical positions to operate its current weapons systems, but
it must also fill research and development positions to create future weapons systems
(Norman, 2000). Recent correspondence within Air Force channels has noted that, not
only is the current workforce aging, but also the organization is having an increasingly
difficult time recruiting and retaining a competent workforce (Norman, 2000; Ryan,
2000, 2001).
Complicating the above problems is the apparent failure of many early knowledge
management efforts—at great cost in some cases (Davenport, DeLong and Beers, 1998).
Some authors have argued one of the main reasons for this failure is that many
knowledge management efforts treated knowledge either as no different from information
and data, or as an asset that could be generated, codified, and transferred with essentially
no friction (Von Hippel, 1994; Pan and Scarbrough, 1999; Szulanski, 2000). Many
authors note that a mismatch between a knowledge project’s goals and organizational
culture might be a major friction reducing the effectiveness of knowledge projects
2

(Davenport, DeLong, and Beers, 1998; Kostova, 1999; Pan and Scarbrough, 1999;
Davenport and Prusak, 2000; Marchand and Davenport, 2000; King, 2001); indeed, some
even name it as the “biggest obstacle” (Costa, 1999). In spite of this, however, no
research was found investigating any relationship between the constructs of knowledge
transfer and organizational culture.
At the same time, researchers and practitioners alike have begun to understand
that knowledge transfer within an organization might represent a lower-cost alternative to
the creation, codification and capture of new knowledge. One practitioner put it this way,
“We used to say knowledge is power. Now we say sharing is power.” (Miller from
Pederson, 1998b:20) In this respect, how can a company increase its use of the
knowledge it already contains? Increased use of knowledge might create the benefits of
increased organizational knowledge without having to expend the energy or cost
associated with creating, codifying, or capturing more knowledge.
Clearly, knowledge management is a powerful tool. Increasing the amount of
knowledge transferred within an organization has the potential to save an organization’s
money while positioning it better to face future challenges; however, organizational
culture is a strong force—one that may hinder the implementation of knowledge
management in an organization. Specifically, organizational culture may affect an
organization’s ability to transfer knowledge because that culture may encourage
individuals to either resist searching out and receiving knowledge or to resist efforts to
move knowledge out of their heads.

3

Problem Statement
As shown earlier, it appears that successful knowledge management efforts may
be critical to the long-term success of an organization. Also shown earlier, many recent
knowledge management efforts have failed, and organizational culture may be to blame.
Considering this, one might argue it is worthwhile to study the correlation between
knowledge transfer and organizational culture; however, to date, there does not appear to
be any research into an interaction between these two constructs.
Research Question
This research asks the following question: is there a correlation between types of
organizational culture and factors influencing knowledge transfer?
Significance of this Study
In the short-term, the ability to identify an organization as “fertile” or “infertile”
to the transfer of knowledge will allow the management of an organization to determine
whether it is worth their time, energy, and assets to invest in sometimes costly knowledge
management efforts. This research parallels that done to determine the initial success of
information technology efforts based on organizational culture variables (Leonard-Barton
and Deschamps, 1998; Hoffman and Klepper, 2000), but expands the scope to knowledge
management efforts—which often include major management change efforts in addition
to the information technology efforts (Davenport and Prusak, 2000). Additionally, in the
long-term, it will show management what environmental factors they might be able to
manipulate to change an organization’s culture over the long-term—to begin to “grow”
an organization that is predisposed to knowledge transfer.
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Scope and Assumptions
Within the knowledge management domain, this research is limited to the
construct of knowledge transfer, and the factors that facilitate or hinder knowledge
transfer from the perspective of the individual sender and the receiver. Within the
management and sociology domains, this research is limited to the construct of
organizational culture, the different types of organizational cultures, and the indicators of
organizational culture. This research is limited to investigating whether or not a
correlational relationship exists between the operationalized variables shown in the
literature to represent the constructs of knowledge transfer and organizational culture;
causality is not investigated. Finally, both the study and implications of this research are
limited in application to United States Air Force (hereafter called Air Force) units and
personnel.
Thesis Structure
The next chapter investigates the constructs of knowledge transfer and
organizational culture. It pays specific attention to the interaction between knowledge
transfer and organizational culture, and formulates specific hypotheses as to their
interaction. Chapter three describes the research methodology developed to measure the
constructs of knowledge transfer and organizational culture, and their interaction.
Chapter four describes the results of the research performed to investigate the relationship
between knowledge transfer and organizational culture, noting which hypotheses were
supported and which hypotheses were not supported. Finally, chapter five discusses
conclusions drawn from the research, limitations of the current study, and directions for
future research in this area.
5

II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview
This chapter contains three sections: “knowledge,” “organizational culture,” and
“knowledge and organizational culture.” The first section explores the definition of
knowledge, with an explanation of the complexity of the concept and its importance to an
organization’s sustained performance. Next, the discipline of knowledge management is
explained, with an overview given of its purpose within the context of an organization.
Finally, knowledge transfer is explored as a sub-discipline of knowledge management,
with an investigation of the known factors influencing knowledge transfer.
The second section explores the definition of organizational culture, explaining
the complexity of the concept. Next, the importance of organizational culture to an
organization’s sustained performance is explained. Finally, the different types of
organizational culture are explored.
Within the knowledge and organizational culture section, the link between
knowledge transfer—an individual phenomenon, and organizational culture—a group
phenomenon, is explained. The issue is first put in context by explaining the concept of
organizational economics, with specific attention paid to the two major propositions of
organizational economics: agency theory, and transaction cost economics. Next, the
constructs of knowledge transfer and organizational economics are evaluated in the
context of organizational economics to define the terms “fertile” and “infertile” with
respect to knowledge transfer. Finally, the constructs of knowledge transfer and
organizational culture are juxtaposed to define the hypotheses studied.
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Knowledge
Knowledge Defined
The question, “what is knowledge,” is not new to humanity. In the realm of
philosophy, the study of knowledge has its own name, epistemology: one of the four
core questions (unanswered) facing humanity (Sober, 1991). In epistemology, the
traditionally accepted definition, attributed to Socrates and Plato, is that knowledge is a
“justified true belief.” (Sober, 1991:142) This definition, though it enjoys wide
distribution, does not enjoy wide acceptance (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995).
Additionally, this definition fails to address some important aspects of knowledge critical
to a thorough understanding of its relevance to business. Unfortunately, many businessoriented definitions of knowledge fail to satisfy some of the basic philosophical
implications of their use. Therefore, quite unsurprisingly, there still exists considerable
divergence in the definition of knowledge (Spiegler, 2000). With a complete
understanding that any research is dependent upon premises as well as argumentation, it
is important to begin with a definition of knowledge that is both philosophically sound
and useful to practitioners.
To converge on a useful definition of knowledge, it is important to first discuss
what it is not, or more accurately what it is not only. According to much current
literature, knowledge is not information, nor is it data, but it is comprised of them both
(Tuomi, 1999; Spiegler, 2000; Davenport and Prusak, 2000). Data is commonly defined
as facts at the atomic level, devoid of both structure and context, or stripped of previously
existing structure and context (Tuomi, 1999). Information is commonly defined as data
endowed with meaningful structures (Tuomi, 1999). Knowledge, on the other hand, is
7

information endowed with context (Tuomi, 1999). Therefore, knowledge, while being
comprised of data or information, is something more. Additionally, many definitions of
knowledge add that it must be in the mind of a human (Polanyi, 1958; Davenport and
Prusak, 2000). In other words, whereas a computer can store and transmit both data and
information, only a human can store and transmit knowledge.
Another view of knowledge sees it as either explicit or tacit. First described by
Michael Polanyi (1958) in his book, Personal Knowledge, and further defined in his
(1966) book The Tacit Dimension, explicit knowledge is knowledge that can be
explained, whereas tacit knowledge cannot be explained. This distinction will become
important in the forthcoming discussion of kno wledge transfer, but it is important to note
that it is not a mutually exclusive distinction; rather, it is helpful to view the explicit-tacit
distinction as a continuum. Both Polanyi (1966), and more recently, Ikujiro Nonaka and
Hirotaka Takeuchi (1995) in their book, The Knowledge Creating Company, point out
that knowledge may be either explicit or tacit or a combination of the two. Further,
knowledge may become either more tacit or more explicit as an individual learns or is
better able to articulate what is in his or her head (Polanyi, 1966; Nonaka and Takeuchi,
1995).
Finally, it is useful to understand the personal nature of knowledge. In fact,
Polanyi (1966) described all knowledge as inherently personal. The way he described it,
all knowledge in fact has a tacit component when it resides in the mind of a person.
Therefore, he argued, when transferring this knowledge from one person to another, the
knowledge changes in the sense that the other individual must interpret the knowledge in
the context of his or her own person. In fact, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), using this
8

same framework, argue that the traditional philosophical definition of knowledge as a
justified true belief becomes irrelevant in practice because knowledge means different
things to different people. They argue for a revised definition, “Knowledge [is] a
dynamic human process of justifying personal belief toward the ‘truth’ (Nonaka and
Takeuchi, 1995:58).”
Therefore, to be considered useful to an organization, a representative definition
of knowledge must include three concepts: first, it must point out that knowledge is more
than data or information; second, it must describe the tacit or explicit nature of
knowledge; third, it must describe the personal nature of knowledge. Dave nport and
Prusak offer the following definition:
Knowledge is a fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual information, and
expert insight that provides a framework for evaluating and incorporating new
experiences and information. It originates and is applied in the minds of knowers. In
organizations, it often becomes embedded not only in documents or repositories but
also in organizational routines, processes, practices, and norms. (Davenport and
Prusak, 2000:5)
Though the above definition is somewhat wordy, it encompasses all the
important qualities of knowledge of interest to an organization defined above; therefore,
this definition of knowledge is adopted for the purposes of this study. As will be shown,
this definition contains key components of organizational cultures: mixed experience,
values, and a framework for evaluating an incorporating new experiences and
information, and embedded within routines, processes, practices and norms, and hence is
inextricably linked to organizational cult ure.

9

Knowledge Management
One question arising from the previous description of knowledge is, “how can it
be managed?” Clearly, knowledge is a complicated, and intensely personal phenomenon
and any attempt to manage it will be complicated as well. Perhaps this leads to another
legitimate question, “why would an organization even want to manage the knowledge in
its employees?” For a long time, most organizations answered these questions by saying,
essentially, “not only can knowledge not be managed, but even if it could be we would
not want to.” Indeed, most organizations were content to simply manage their data and
information—both of which are more easily stored and transferred using modern data and
information processing systems (Drucker, 1988).
Howeve r, the data and information management paradigm led to three unintended
consequences. First, as both data and information stores began to fill up, and became
interconnected, the realization came that there was probably more data and information
than it was possible to interpret. This is commonly called “information overload.”
(Davenport and Prusak, 2000:xiv) Second, as companies downsized in the latter decades
of the Twentieth Century, they relied on their data and information stores to maintain a
competitive market edge, while viewing their employees as expendable capital (Womack,
Jones, and Roos, 1990). Last, the increased investments in information apparently
provided little or no business benefit, defined in the literature as the “productivity
paradox.” (Brynjolfsson, 1993; Kolekofski, 1997) These interconnected consequences
led to organizations that were less flexible than before. In other words, the original
knowledge that created systems and processes was gone, but the systems and processes
remained—in some cases representing significant investments. Effectively, this forced
10

organizations to do business the same way as 10 or 20 years previous, with processes that
did not exploit current technology, without knowing exactly why.
In the midst of the confusion, a few voices began to call for a new paradigm.
Instead of worshipping at the false idols of data and information, the new standard for
measuring worth in a corporation would be knowledge, and its corollary, learning.
A learning organization is an organization skilled at creating, acquiring, and
transferring knowledge, and at modifying its behavior to reflect new knowledge and
insights. (Garvin, 1998:51)
This definition is echoed in Davenport and Prusak’s (2000) book, Working Knowledge.
This text defines the three main components of knowledge management as: knowledge
generation, knowledge codification and coordination, and knowledge transfer (Davenport
and Prusak, 2000). Delving into the two definitions offered above, it is possible to
consolidate them into a combined definition of components:
1) Creation, Generation, and Acquisition of New Knowledge
2) Codification and Coordination of Knowledge
3) Transfer of Knowledge (includes absorption and modification of behavior)
As described in Chapter 1, the main emphasis in business has been on the second
component, codification and coordination of knowledge—making tacit knowledge more
explicit. Research into expert systems abounded, at significant cost (Odom and Dorr,
1995). Quite secondarily, significant efforts at the first component, creation, generation,
and acquisition of new knowledge, abounded (Leonard-Barton, 1995; Nonaka and
Takeuchi, 1995). Perhaps unfortunately, the discipline of knowledge transfer was deemphasized in favor of the other two. Evidence of the problems business now faces
because of this decision abounds in the popular media, with perhaps the most frequent
11

mention made of situations involving consultants and outsourcing arrangements (ChienAi, 1991; Horwitt, 1996; Anonymous, 1998; Pederson, 1998a; Kerr, 1998).
Knowledge Transfer
As described above, knowledge transfer is just one of three aspects of knowledge
management—one that has perhaps received the least attention of the three in recent
years. In individual psychology, however, the study of knowledge transfer predates the
study of knowledge management by several decades (Argote, Ingram, Levine, and
Moreland, 2000). Indeed, the concept that knowledge transfer represents not only a
competitive advantage within a firm, but that it represents a less expensive alternative to
knowledge creation and acquisition is well documented in economics literature:
. . . Opportunities for profitable team production by inputs already within the firm
may be ascertained more economically and accurately than for resources outside the
firm. Superior combinations of inputs can be more economically identified and
formed from resources already used in the organization than by obtaining new
resources (and knowledge of them) from the outside. . . . Efficient production with
heterogeneous resources is a result not of having better resources but in knowing
more accurately the relative productive performances of those resources. (Alchian
and Demsetz, 1972:793)
Interestingly, this concept recently gained attention in organizational behavior literature
as well (Argote and Ingram, 2000).
One of the phenomena related to knowledge is that, “unlike material assets, which
decrease as they are used, knowledge assets increase with use: ideas breed new ideas,
and shared knowledge stays with the giver while it enriches the receiver.” (Davenport &
Prusak, 2000:17) Knowledge transfer, then, is a corollary to knowledge creation. Once
knowledge is created, it acts as an economy of scale as it is shared—both because more
than one individual can use knowledge at the same time, and because shared knowledge

12

stimulates the creation of new knowledge. Further, knowledge transfer appears to reduce
overall organizational costs by preventing a second group of individuals from repeating
the mistakes of a first group of individuals (Gruenfeld, Martorana, and Fan). In fact, it
appears that increased knowledge transfer contributes to overall organizational success
(Baum and Ingram, 1998). For these reasons, it should be apparent that knowledge
transfer is every bit as important as knowledge generation—perhaps even more so if one
considers overall organizational costs.
The theory of knowledge transfer assumes the knowledge to be transferred
already exists (i.e., is separate from knowledge creation—even though the two are
related). Knowledge transfer is concerned with the two-step process of moving it from
one individual to another, though some sources talk to the ability to aggregate these
transfers at the organizational level (Mahler, 1997). To achieve transmission, the
knowledge must first be transmitted by the knowledge sender, and then absorbed by the
knowledge receiver (Davenport & Prusak, 2000:101). If this sounds familiar, it is
because this is an extension of communication theory (Gibson, Ivancevich & Donnely,
1997:424). Within the domain of knowledge management, however, a further dimension
is added to the concept of knowledge transfer. Knowledge, once received, must then be
used to be considered useful to an organization (Davenport and Prusak, 2000:101).
Previous literature has shown numerous examples of organizations successful at
the transfer of knowledge (Zairi and Whymark, 2000), but most offer little insight into
how those companies became successful. To fully understand how to “grow” knowledge
transfer capability, it is first important to understand what factors tend to affect
knowledge transfer. According to the literature, knowledge transfer may often be
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influenced by environmental factors (Marcha nd and Davenport, 2000; Davenport and
Prusak, 2000), also termed “frictions,” but again, the extent to which it is influenced is
incompletely explored in previous literature. It is to this issue we now turn.
Factors Affecting Knowledge Transfer
We now exp lore in detail the various frictions that might influence successful
transfer of knowledge in an organization. Davenport and Prusak note the following:
Many knowledge initiatives have been based on the utopian assumption that
knowledge moves without fric tion or motivating force, that people will share
knowledge with no concern for what they may gain or lose by doing so. (Davenport
and Prusak, 2000:26)
From the above analyses of the intensely personal nature of knowledge and the failure of
so many recent knowledge management efforts, it appears the assumption they refer to
proves untrue; however, to fully understand why this assumption proves untrue, we must
examine those factors that might influence knowledge transfer.
Kitchen (1999) pointed to four factors that might influence information transfer:
personal, interpersonal, architectural, and administrative. A more recent literature review
within the knowledge domain provided the following five factors that might influence
knowledge transfer: relational channels (Rulke, Zaheer, and Anderson, 2000), partner
similarity (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Darr and Kurtzberg, 2000), depreciation (Argote,
Beckman, and Epple, 1990; Darr, Argote and Epple, 1995), organizational selfknowledge (Rulke, Zaheer, and Anderson, 2000), and divergence of interests (Alchian
and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Donaldson, 1990).
As shown in Figure 1, the factors influencing information transfer and those
influencing knowledge transfer appear to overlap. This is somewhat unsurprising,
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considering both types of transfer occur in the same context, within the same
organizations, and using the same channels.

Factors Influencing
Information Transfer:

Factors Influencing
Knowledge Transfer:

(Kitchen, 1999)

Architectural

Relational Channels
Partner Similarity

Interpersonal
Divergence of Interests
Administrative
Personal

Depreciation
Organizational Self-Knowledge

Figure 1: Comparison of Information Transfer and Knowledge Transfer

Factor 1: Relational Channels
First, as examined earlier, the quality of the knowledge to be transferred (tacit
versus explicit) affects knowledge transfer (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). Specifically,
the more tacit the knowledge is, the more difficult it will be to transfer that knowledge.
However, if all knowledge has a tacit component, as Polanyi argues it does, then some
form of relational channel, defined broadly as two-way human-to- human contact, is
necessary to transfer knowledge effectively. If this is the case, it is possible to argue that
the tacit-explicit continuum becomes less relevant, as the true predictor of knowledge
transfer success becomes whether the channel chosen for transfer is relational (Morey and
Frangioso, 1997; Rulke, Zaheer, and Anderson, 2000). Instead, the degree to which
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knowledge is tacit, in concert with the richness of communication channels, appears only
to affect the speed by which knowledge is diffused (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Cisse,
2001). Finally, relational channels only appear to increase transfer of knowledge on the
individual level; a group face-to-face discussion may in fact reduce overall pooling of
information (Stasser, Vaughan, and Stewart, 2000).
Factor 2: Partner Similarity
Second, one might imagine that, much like the tacit-explicit continuum, the
complexity of the knowledge to be transferred influences its transfer. In fact, it is more
likely that the similarity of individuals attempting the transfer will influence the transfer
(Almeida and Kogut, 1999). Further examination shows this a reasonable explanation, as
to individuals with similar interests, backgrounds, or educations, complexity begins to
seem a relative term. In fact, a recent study showed partner similarity to be a strong
predictor of knowledge transfer between organizations—especially strategic similarity
(Darr and Kurtzberg, 2000).
Factor 3: Depreciation
Third, if we accept the definition of “transfer plus absorption,” it is clear that
“depreciation” of knowledge transferred—defined as loss of knowledge after it is
transferred—affects knowledge transfer success (Argote, Beckman, and Epple, 1990;
Darr, Argote and Epple, 1995). However, depreciation becomes less explanatory as the
effects of turnover are accounted for, and is therefore removed from the subsequent
discussions.
Factor 4: Organizational Self-Knowledge
Fourth, the concept of organizational self-knowledge refers to the degree to which
individuals have knowledge of what they as individuals know, and likewise for those
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individuals surrounding them. It is a key prerequisite to knowledge transfer because
without this self-knowledge, the knowledge sender and receiver will most likely never
meet to make a transfer (Moreland and Myaskovsky, 2000; Rulke, Zaheer, and Anderson,
2000).
Factor 5: Divergence of Interests
Fifth, it seems clear that any breakdown on the part of the sender or receiver of
the knowledge to be transferred with respect to the will to transfer the knowledge will
preclude the occurrence of a knowledge transfer. It has been established that individual
interests and organizational interests tend to diverge (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen
and Meckling, 1976; Donaldson, 1990). For this reason, it seems apparent that market
forces will work within an organization to influence the transfer of knowledge, and that
divergence of interests will tend to inhibit knowledge transfer.
As shown earlier, environmental factors, also called frictions, appear to influence
the transfer of knowledge within an organization. With the exception of depreciation,
there appears to be one item shared in common between each of the four remaining
frictions: that of the influence of organizational culture. Before explaining this
commonality, though, it is necessary to answer the larger question of what the term
“organizational culture” means, and its implications.
Organizational Culture
Organizational Culture Defined
It is nearly axiomatic to state that values and beliefs exist at the individual level;
numerous management and leadership texts speak to the diversity of values and beliefs
existing in the minds of an organization’s personnel (Gibson, Ivancevich, and Donnelly,
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1997; Yukl, 1998). In fact, as explored earlier, values and beliefs are imbedded into
individual knowledge. One group of authors explains the importance of values in an
organization: “Values affect the perceptions not only of appropriate ends but also of
appropriate means to those ends.” (Gibson, Ivancevich, and Donnelly, 1997:105)
Academics and practitioners alike agree that, to the leadership in an organization,
therefore, it is imperative to attempt to understand individual values and beliefs as they
relate to the job at hand because they will affect employees’ work performance (Ott,
1989; Gibson, Ivancevich, and Donnelly, 1997; Anonymous, 2000).
How much more important is it, then, to understand an organizations’ values and
beliefs, if there is such an entity? Understandably, if an organization’s members share a
common set of values and beliefs, it might be easier for leadership to attempt to
understand and make use of the shared values rather than each individuals’ values.
From an organizational perspective, the collective values and beliefs of the
individual members of that organization represent a phenome non called, “organizational
culture.” Noted researcher Edgar Schein puts it this way:
Culture can now be defined as (a) a pattern of basic assumptions, (b) invented,
discovered, or developed by a given group, (c) as it learns to cope with its problems
of external adaptation and internal integration, (d) that has worked well enough to be
considered valid and, therefore (e) is to be taught to new members as the (f) correct
way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems. (Schein, 1990:111)
What Schein further points out is that an organization’s culture, much like values and
beliefs at the individual level, is an anxiety reduction mechanism—a way to cope with
uncertainty (Schein, 1990:111). Much like a type of tacit knowledge, an organization’s
culture resides not only in its written documents (called “artifacts”), but also in the minds
of its individuals—affecting their perception and actions. In fact, when one compares the
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above definition to that of knowledge, presented earlier, it appears as though culture and
knowledge are similar concepts, perhaps influenced by some of the same forces.
One aspect of organizational culture that Schein leaves out of his definition, but
mentions in explanation of it, is the fact that organization’s culture grows over a long
period, and is unlikely to change quickly (Schein, 1990; Lundberg, 1996). Because of
this and other factors, Schein further notes that an organization measured at a point in
time might not have any discernable culture, or even that organizational cultures might
exist at numerous levels within an organization (Schein, 1990:111).
An idea attributed to Schein, and expanded in J. Ott’s (1989) book, The
Organizational Culture Perspective, is that there are three levels at which organizational
culture resides, with each level more hidden than the previous. These levels are
artifacts/patterns of behavior, beliefs and values, and basic underlying assumptions (Ott,
1989:54). It is useful to explain these levels, as they are important to consider when one
decides to measure (and how to measure) organizational culture.
Artifacts/Patterns of Behavior
The most obvious level of organizational culture, artifacts include,
“. . . Material and nonmaterial objects and patterns that intentionally or
unintentionally communicate information about the organization’s technology,
beliefs, values, assumptions, and ways of doing things.” (Ott, 1989:24)
Examples of artifacts include reports, operating instructions, and physical layout of office
space, but also include language used in the workplace, including both jargon and
metaphors, and may also include myths or organizational hero stories, sagas and legends,
and even ceremonies and celebrations. Artifacts are easier to measure than behaviors and
values because they are often visible. However, artifacts tend to give a researcher the
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least insight into an organization’s culture (Ott, 1989), and may require qualitative
techniques to identify and measure (Barclay and York, 1996). Further, some argue a
degree of caution is advisable to the researcher wishing to measure culture using artifacts
as surrogates; after all, an organization’s espoused culture may not always coincide with
their actual culture (Hawkins, 1997; Darrah, 1997).
Sometimes harder to observe than artifacts, patterns of behavior are routine
activities that “communicate information about the organization’s technology, beliefs,
values, assumptions, and ways of doing things.” (Ott, 1989:36) Examples of patterns of
behavior include rites and rituals, which differ from ceremonies in that they are habits
that occur more often (e.g., daily), and behavioral norms, which represent a consensus of
“the way things should be done around here.” Behavior may prove a more reliable
measure of culture than artifacts—perhaps because over time they are harder to “fake”
(Hawkins, 1997). Patterns of behavior may also be measured qualitatively, and there is
evidence that attempting to measure them quantitatively produces misleading results (Ott,
1989).
Beliefs and Values
“Beliefs are consciously held, cognitive (mental) views about truth and reality . . .
values are conscious, affective (emotion- laden) desires or wants.” (Ott, 1989:39)
Examples of beliefs and values include ethical codes and ideologies. Quite interestingly,
it is difficult to infer values and beliefs from qualitative research, as they tend to resist
direct observation (Ott, 1989). Also interesting is that beliefs and values seem to avail
themselves to quantitative techniques. Though counterintuitive at first, this can be
explained by the fact that values and beliefs are often consciously held—and therefore
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react well to overt questioning (Ott, 1989). This said, Ott (1989) qualifies his approval of
quantitative measures by saying they will make little sense without the context provided
by qualitative measures. In his study, the beliefs and values questionnaire was most
valuable in that it stimulated discussion that led to a more thorough understanding of the
organization’s culture (Ott, 1989).
Basic Underlying Assumptions
Basic underlying assumptions are the aspects of individual (and organizational)
personality that have grown over such a long time, and perhaps so subtly, as to be
considered tacit. Since underlying assumptions are seen as a tacit manifestation of
organizational culture, Ott (1989) argues they tend to resist measurement by any
technique, either qualitative or quantitative. Unfortunately, this is also the level with
which an organizational culture researcher holds the most interest, since presumably a
shared organizational culture resides mostly at this level.
Ott (1989) posits the best way to access this level of organizational culture is by
way of proxy—measuring other levels as close to this level as possible, then making a
logical inference as to the best explanation for the observations. This is commonly called
making an abductive inference (Sober, 1991). Though one cannot argue with Ott’s
conservative approach to measuring basic underlying assumptions, Polanyi (1966) gives
hope for the quantitative researcher when he proposes:
. . . All our thought contains components of which we are subsidiarily aware in the
focal content of our thinking, and that all thought dwells in its subsidiaries, as if they
were parts of our body. Hence, thinking is not only necessarily intentional . . . it is
also necessarily fraught with the roots that it embodies. (Polanyi, 1966:x)
This statement indicates it may indeed be possible to measure an organization’s basic
underlying assumptions, if one is cautious in his or her approach. Indeed, many
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quantitative survey instruments claim to do just this—reliably (Xenikou and Furnham,
1996).
The Importance of Organizational Culture
As seen above, an organization’s culture is an important (if subconscious) guiding
force in an organization. It grows and remains stable over relatively long periods, and
may exist at numerous different levels of an organization. The stability of an
organizational culture makes it a potentially powerful force within an organization. One
question that remains unanswered is whether organizational cultures are beneficial or
detrimental forces in an organization.
In her book, Wellsprings of Knowledge, Dorothy Leonard-Barton (1995) notes
that shared values and norms of an organizatio n represent one of its core capabilities.
According to Leonard-Barton, core capabilities are those capabilities an organization has
grown over time that it knows better than any other organization—and are therefore
essential to its success (Leonard-Barton, 1995). Shared values and norms are, therefore,
a type of tacit organizational knowledge that incorporate years of learning how to best
perform tasks. When business remains stable, shared values and norms help a company
gain a competitive advantage by avoiding the mistakes of the past, for example. In many
cases, they are shaped from the earliest days of an organization’s existence, and usually
an organization retains some of its “personality” from the early days of its existence
almost indefinitely (Leonard-Barton, 1995).
However, Leonard-Barton (1995) also notes the following: “every core capability
is also inherently a core rigidity.” By acknowledging that past successes and failures
taint an organization’s perception of the present and future, it becomes evident that a
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shared values and norms might lead to the following deleterious effects: limited problem
solving, sterile implementation/inability to innovate, limited experimentation, and most
importantly, screening out new knowledge (Leonard-Barton, 1995; Levine, Higgins, and
Choi, 2001). Put another way, an organization’s culture may be seen as a link to a tacit
power structure, grown over time; when the old power structure is threatened, “The
resistance is subtle and covert—and it is often successful.” (Kotter and Heskett, 1992:79)
The above analysis shows organizational culture to be similar to the mythical
Gemini—a two- faced being that can both help and hurt at the same time. The important
item to note is that organizational culture affects organizational performance—both
overtly, through its influence over standards and behavior, and less overtly, through its
influence over basic underlying assumptions. It is now important to turn to the question
of what types of organizational cultures have been identified. Only through classifying
an organization’s culture is it possible to begin to answer the question of whether that
culture is “fertile” or “infertile” with respect to our construct of interest, knowledge
transfer.
Types of Organizational Culture
Since the concept of organizational culture is derived from the concept of values
and beliefs, it is should come as no surprise that there are as many different
organizational cultures as there are organizations. For example, in a multidimensional
survey of 20 international units of IBM, every unit mean score was significantly different
(Hofstede and Neuijen, 1990).
This fact notwithstanding, a number of research efforts have identified distinct
types of organizational culture that appear to explain most of the variance between
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organizations—with each researcher using different terminologies and methods to
describe a few seemingly similar concepts. A recent study consolidated much of this
research using a factor analysis (Xenikou and Furnham, 1996). Because this study
considered, and then summarized much of the major research over the past 20 years, it is
explained here in some detail.
The authors of this study identified six interdependent factors explaining just over
seventy percent of the variance between four of the most common measures of
organizational culture. They also measured internal reliability of the measures to ensure
the applicability of their results back to the original questionnaires (all of which were
previously validated). The six factors identified, hereafter referred to as types of
organizational culture, are now discussed.
Type 1: Openness to Change/Innovation
This organizational culture type groups the following concepts together:
humanistic orientation, affiliation, achie vement, self-actualization, task support, task
innovation, and hands-on management (further defined as: managers should not just
plan, but participate) (Xenikou and Furnham, 1996:363). They are explained as by the
authors as follows:
These concepts seem to stress openness to change, innovation, and achievement
within a humanistic social environment where cooperation is highly valued and
members are expected to be supportive and open to influence in their dealings with
one another. (Xenikou and Furnham, 1996:362).
An organization scoring high on this factor might be considered “friendly,” and “open to
change.” Put negatively, one might call this an organization of “nosey neighbors.”
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Type 2: Task-Oriented Organizational Growth
This organizational culture type groups the following concepts together: being
the best, innovation, attention to detail, quality orientation, profit orientation, and shared
philosophy (Xenikou and Furnham, 1996:363). The authors compare this to the “Kaisen”
philosophy espoused by successful Japanese companies that stress cautious, incremental
improvement. An organization scoring high in this factor might be considered “taskoriented” versus “people-oriented.” Put negatively, one might call this an organization of
“strivers,” or “impersonal.”
Type 3: Bureaucratic
This organizational culture type groups the following concepts together:
approval, conventionality, dependence, avoidance, and [lack of] personal freedom
(Xenikou and Furnham, 1996:363). The authors describe this culture as formal, with
centralized decision-making. An organization scoring high on this factor might be
considered “conservative” or “prudent.” Put negatively, one might call this an
organization that is “passive,” or “defensive.”
Type 4: Artifacts
This organizational culture type groups the following concepts together: values,
heroes, rituals, and cultural network (Xenikou and Furnham, 1996:363). These items
measure whether or not members of an organization recognize the concepts listed above
as part of their culture. For this reason, the authors make the point that this factor
probably does not measure a type of organizational culture so much as it measures
whether or not an organization has a strong culture. An organization scoring high on this
factor might be considered one that has a discernable culture. An organization scoring
low on this factor might be considered one that does not have a discernable culture.
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Since this factor does not appear to prescribe any behavior, it is eliminated from the
subsequent analysis and discussion of correlation with knowledge transfer.
Type 5: Competition/Confrontation
This organizational culture type groups the following concepts together:
oppositional orientation, power, competition, and perfectionism (Xenikou and Furnham,
1996:363). The authors describe this culture as one where perfection is the goal, and
where individuals might tend to react negatively towards the ideas of others and/or resist
new ideas. An organization scoring high on this factor might be considered a
“perfectionist” organization. Put negatively, one might call this organization a “dog-eatdog” organization.
Type 6: Positive Relations
This organizational culture type groups the following concepts together: social
relations, “work should be fun,” the value of people, and communication (Xenikou and
Furnham, 1996:363). The authors describe this culture as one where friendship with
coworkers is encouraged, as are social activities and socializing. An organization scoring
high on this factor might be considered “a fun place to work,” or “a family environment.”
Put negatively, one might call this organization, “lazy,” or “touchy-feely.” While
important to an organization, this particular item did not explain enough of the variance
between the survey items mentioned and had significant overlap with the other factors
(such as openness to change/innovation); therefore, it is eliminated from the subsequent
analysis and discussion of correlation with knowledge transfer.
Having outlined organizational culture, its importance, and the some of the more
commonly measured types of organizational culture, we now may ask what specific types
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of organizational culture might be identified as “fertile” or “infertile” with respect to
knowledge transfer. It is to this task we now turn.
Knowledge Transfer and Organizational Culture
Organizational Economics: The Linking Mechanism
The above analysis endeavored to make two points: knowledge transfer is likely
to be rife with friction, and organizational culture is a likely cause of individual action.
However, the method of interaction between knowledge transfer and organizational
culture is yet to be explained. To begin this explanation, we begin by discussing
“knowledge markets”—defined as a place (either physical or, more likely conceptual)
where knowledge is transferred at a cost (Davenport and Prusak, 2000). Knowledge
markets affect knowledge transfer, through the costs associated with knowledge, and
organizational culture influences an organization’s perception of, and actions in,
knowledge markets. With respect to knowledge markets, Davenport and Prusak note the
following:
. . . The only way to have a market that works well is, first of all, to recognize that
market forces exist; second, to try to understand how it functions; and third, to make
it more efficient. (Davenport and Prusak, 2000)
Already, this paper has alluded to the two key components of a management
theory called “organizational economics”—an organizational concept that attempts to
explain how market forces operate within organizations. These two key components are:
agency theory and transaction cost economics (Donaldson, 1990). Understanding these
components helps further explain the individual behavior one is likely to find in a
knowledge market, as well as how organizational culture might affect knowledge transfer
within a knowledge market (through perception of the knowledge market).
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Agency Costs
Agency theory states that many social relationships can be understood as
interactions between two parties: a principal and an agent. “The principal(s) engage
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves
delegating some decision- making authority to the agent.” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976)
Since the interests of the principal and the agent are inclined to diverge, additional costs
must be incurred (through monitoring and incentives) to ensure the agent acts in
accordance with the principal; these costs are called agency costs. Though the theory
concentrates on individuals, it is easy to see that in an organization exhibiting a culture,
each individual agent will be affected by that culture, to the extent that, an organizational
culture represents the collected interests of multiple agents. At its worst, an organization
ignoring agency costs may turn into an “organizational anarchy” where management
efforts become entirely ineffective in favor of individual market actions that have no
relation to overall strategic goals (Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1972).
In Donaldson’s (1990) analysis of organizational economics, he states an apparent
contradiction that might resist the analysis of an organization’s individuals using a
concept such as organizational culture. He states that economics uses the concept of
“methodological individualism”, which states, “social phenomena . . . should be analyzed
as arising from conscious actions of individuals.” (Donaldson, 1990:371) However, he
notes, “psychologists and sociologists point out that human behavior is often produced
without conscious thought, that is, through habit, emotion, taken-for-granted custom,
conditioned reflex, unconditioned reflex, posthypnotic suggestion, and unconscious
desires.” (Donaldson, 1990:372) Though this analysis is somewhat tongue- in-cheek, it is
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clear this contradiction must be cleared before any analysis is attempted of economic
transactions within an organization—especially with regard to the collected interests of
multiple agents.
Though Donaldson may have been unaware of his writings, Polanyi (1966)
answers this apparent contradiction with his explanation provided earlier of the
interaction between the conscious and the subconscious; namely, that the subconscious is
under the influence of the conscious. Polanyi extends this explanation by stating:
Any attempts to avoid the responsibility for shaping the beliefs which we accept as
true is absurd; but the existentialist claim of choosing our beliefs from zero is now
proved absurd too. Thought can live only on grounds which we adopt in the service
of a reality to which we submit. (Polanyi, 1966:xi)
In this statement, Polanyi opens the door to the possibility that organizational culture can
affect an individual’s actions based on previous, conscious, socialization to that
organizational culture, while at the same time an individual is still in conscious control of
his or her own actions. Put another way, since organizational culture, once accepted,
influences perception, subsequent conscious actions may or may not be in the best
interests of the principal—or even the individual agent, depending on the degree to which
perception is influenced.
As noted in the popular press, the inevitable difference in interests between a
principal and an agent is of primary concern to ensuring the success of knowledge
management efforts (Manchester, 2001). With respect to knowledge transfer, then, it is
possible to say that an organizational culture that is fertile for knowledge transfer will be
one that recognizes and incorporates into its structure and understanding of knowledge
markets, and the costs (frictions) associated with knowledge transfer.
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Transaction Costs
Transaction cost economics refers to the problem inherent in economic
transactions, namely that one party might not be inclined to give the other party the full
value they “owe” (Donaldson, 1990) in a market transaction. The concept rejects the
assumption of simplified economics that buyers and sellers in a market are price-takers.
Interestingly, this type of behavior is only possible in a market with incomplete
information—exactly what some theorists posit about knowledge markets. They argue
that knowledge markets are often inefficient barter markets in which the worth of each
side’s contribution is extremely hard to measure (Morey and Frangioso, 1997). As one
might imagine, the resulting opportunistic behavior is usually detrimental to overall
organizational health.
With respect to knowledge transfer, it is possible to say that an organization fertile
for knowledge transfer is one in which endeavors to reduce ambiguity in the marketplace
and hence, reduce transaction costs.
Knowledge Transfer Factors and the Fertile Organizational Culture
As shown earlier, knowledge transfer seems to be influenced by four factors:
relational channels, partner similarity, organizational self-knowledge, and divergence of
interests. For each of these factors, an explanation is offered below as to the type of
organizational culture (knowledge transfer fertile, or knowledge transfer infertile) that
might be associated with those factors. This section represents a theoretical bridge
between the two theories of knowledge transfer and organizational culture, but is as of
yet unsupported with research. It is included to illustrate how the two theories might be
linked together.
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Relational Channels
An organization with many relational channels for transferring knowledge might
expect more knowledge to be transferred than one that has few, because transaction costs
are likely to be reduced in an organization with many relationa l channels. Relational
channels are a measure of both the number and richness of communication channels. In
this case, it is likely that more relational channels represent more and varied sources of
market information. The more available market information is, the less likely transaction
costs are to be incurred in a market transaction within an organization—to include a
knowledge transfer. For this reason, an organizational culture that fosters many relational
channels for transferring knowledge might be considered a knowledge transfer fertile
organizational culture.
Partner Similarity
An organization with many similar partners might expect more knowledge to be
transferred than one that has few because both agency costs and transaction costs are
likely to be reduced. In an organization in which all members have similar backgrounds,
education levels, and experiences—it is likely they will have the same understanding of a
mission and share a strategic similarity (Darr and Kurtzburg, 2000). Strategic similarity
among all members of an organization is likely to reduce overall monitoring (agency)
costs because agents and principals alike will share the same view of an organization.
Further, similar backgrounds and education levels is likely to reduce transaction costs
because there will not be as large of a differential in overall information between
individuals. Interestingly, knowledge creation may be stymied by this same phenomenon
(Gruenfeld, Martorana, and Fan, 2000). For these reasons, an organizational culture
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encouraging membership by many similar (strategically aligned) partners might be
considered a knowledge transfer fertile organizational culture.
Organizational Self-Knowledge
An organization whose members have organizational self-knowledge might
expect more knowledge to be transferred than one whose members have little
organizational self-knowledge because transaction costs are reduced. Transaction costs,
because they arise from information differentials between individuals, are reduced due to
the amount of information individuals know about themselves and those around them.
For this reason, an organizational culture encouraging members to maintain or increase
their organizational self-knowledge might be considered a knowledge transfer fertile
organizational culture.
Divergence of Interests
An organization whose members’ interests diverge can expect less knowledge to
be transferred than one whose members have converging interests because both agency
and transaction costs are likely to be increased. Agency costs, which arise from a
divergence of interests between principals and agents in an organization are increased
when overall divergence of interests within an organization is increased. Further, a
divergence of interests seems to increase the likelihood of self-serving behavior at the
expense of overall organizational performance—because individuals either do not
understand how organizational performance benefits them personally, or do not care. For
these reasons, an organizational culture that does not encourage members to recognize
and compensate for the costs of transferring knowledge might be considered a
knowledge-transfer infertile organizational culture.
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Organizational Culture Types and the Fertile Organizational Culture
As shown earlier, there are four types of organizational cultures of interest with
respect to knowledge transfer: openness to change/innovation, task-oriented
organizational growth, bureaucratic, and competition/confrontation. In each of these
cases, an explanation is offered for the type of organizational culture factors that might be
associated with type of organizational culture. As with the previous section, this section
represents a theoretical bridge between the two theories of knowledge transfer and
organizational culture, but is as of yet unsupported with research. It is included to
illustrate how the two theories might be linked together.
Openness to Change/Innovation
An organizational culture that is open to change, innovation, and achievement
appears to be one in which agency costs have been properly addressed and transaction
costs might be minimized, and the willingness to transfer knowledge might be high.
Agency costs might be reduced because of the increased role of individual achievement
in an openness to change/innovation culture. Although it is possible to argue that overall
organizational performance might suffer because of this focus, it is also likely that
monitoring costs will be reduced—or are at the very least properly addressed by the
increased focus on individuals. Transaction costs might be minimized because of the
overall encouragement of activities such as brainstorming—encouraging the sharing of
new ideas by all members without value judgment. The free sharing of new ideas an
information is likely to drive down information differentials between individuals. For
these reasons, an organizational culture that is open to change, innovation, and
achievement might be considered a knowledge-transfer fertile organizational culture.
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Task-Oriented Organizational Growth
An organizational culture that is interested in being the best and innovation
appears to be one in which agency costs have been properly addressed, and the
willingness to transfer knowledge might be high. In an organization that stresses group
performance, it is likely that monitoring costs are properly addressed in the form of
performance monitoring. An organization willing to pay those monitoring costs is also
likely to reap the benefits of that investments. For this reason, an organizational culture
that is task-oriented might be considered a knowledge-transfer fertile organizational
culture.
Bureaucratic
An organizational culture that is bureaucratic appears to be one in which neither
agency costs nor transaction costs have been properly addressed, and the willingness to
transfer knowledge might be low. In a bureaucratic culture, avoidance is high and
personal freedom is discouraged, which might lead increased overall monitoring costs. It
is unclear whether a bureaucratic organization is one that reduces these costs like an
openness to change/innovation culture might, or properly addresses these costs, like a
task-oriented organizational growth culture might. Transaction costs might not properly
addressed in a bureaucratic culture because overall communication is discouraged. Any
reduction in communication might lead to an information differential between
individuals. For these reasons, an organizational culture that is bureaucratic might be
considered a knowledge-transfer infertile organizational culture.
Competition/Confrontation
An organizational culture that is marked by competition and confrontation
appears to be one in which both agency costs and transaction costs have not been
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properly addressed, and the willingness to transfer knowledge might be low. Agency
costs are unlikely to have been addressed in a competition/confrontation culture because
it fosters an oppositional orientetion and competition between its members. In this case,
agents are unlikely to care about the strategic goals of the principal, and overall
monitoring costs might be high. It is unclear as to whether this type of organization takes
these costs into account. Transaction costs are likely to be increased in a
competition/confrontation culture because individual power struggles are likely to reduce
the incentive to share market information. For these reasons, an organizational culture
that is competitive and confrontational might be considered a knowledge-transfer infertile
organizational culture.
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Organizational Culture and Knowledge Transfer: Constructs and Variables
Figure 2 lists the constructs and variables defined earlier, as well as the
interactions explored in this research. This research concentrated on the operationalized
variables and the ir interactions. It did not measure the constructs themselves or the links
between the constructs and the operationalized variables. Finally, organizational
economics as a linking mechanism was not measured directly in this research. This was
left to future efforts.
CONSTRUCTS
Organizational
Culture

Shown in
Literature/
LinkNot
Measured

Organizational
Economics

Link Not
Measured

Knowledge
Transfer

Shown in
Literature/
LinkNot
Measured

Organizational
Economics
(NotMeasured)

Openness to
Change/
Innovation

Relational
Channels

Task-Oriented
Organizational
Growth

Partner
Similarity

Competition/
Confrontation

Organizational
Self-Knowledge

Bureaucratic

Divergence of
Interests

OPERATIONALIZED VARIABLES

Figure 2: Constructs, Operationalized Variables, and Interactions Explored
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Organizational Culture and Knowledge Transfer: The Hypotheses
The four hypotheses investigated in this research are listed below and in Figure 3.
H1: Organizations exhibiting an “openness to change/innovation” organizational culture
will have (a) more relational channels, (b) higher partner similarity, (c) more
organizational self-knowledge, and (d) less divergence of interests than those not
exhibiting an “openness to change/innovation” organizational culture.
H2: Organizations exhibiting a “task-oriented organizational growth” organizational
culture will have (a) more relational channels, (b) higher partner similarity, (c) more
organizational self-knowledge, and (d) less divergence of interests than those not
exhibiting a “task-oriented organizational growth” organizational culture.
H3: Organizations exhibiting a “bureaucratic” organizational culture will have (a) fewer
relational channels, (b) lower partner similarity, (c) less organizational selfknowledge, and (d) more divergence of interests than those not exhibiting a
“bureaucratic” organizational culture.
H4: Organizations exhibiting a “competition/confrontation” organizational culture will
have (a) fewer relational channels, (b) lower partner similarity, (c) less organizational
self-knowledge, and (d) more divergence of interests than those not exhibiting a
“competition/confrontation” organizational culture.

Types of
Organizational Culture

Factors Influencing
Knowledge Transfer

Openness to
Change/Innovation

Relational
Channels

Task-Oriented
Organizational
Growth

+

Partner
Similarity

+
-

Organizational
Self-Knowledge

Bureaucratic

Competition/
Confrontation

Divergence of
Interests (-)

Figure 3: Proposed Correlations between Operationalized Variables
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III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
This chapter explains the research methodology used to explore the relationship
between the constructs of knowledge transfer and organizational culture. It is divided
into seven sections. In the first section, the experimental design and research methods
chosen for this research are explained. In the second section, the population of interest is
described, as are the various sampling frames used to determine a sample representative
of the overall population of interest. In the third section, the methodology used to create
the research instrument is described. The fourth section outlines the steps taken to gain
permission to conduct the research with the desired sample population. The fifth section
outlines the pre-test undertaken to refine the survey instrument. The sixth section
outlines a pilot test undertaken to increase the validity of the research instrument before
its use. Finally, the seventh section describes the administration of the research
instrument.
Experimental Design and Research Method
As noted in Chapter 2, many researchers prefer to measure organizational culture
using longitudinal qualitative techniques (Ott, 1989). However, longitudinal qualitative
studies, by their nature, do not lend themselves to a large, widely diverse population. For
example, the Air Force, with an authorized strength of over 8,350 units located around
the globe, staffed by more then 760,000 active duty, civilian, guard, reserve, and ready
reserve personnel, is inaccessible to all but the most ambitious longitudinal qualitative
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research (Air Force Magazine, 2001; Hallam, 2001). To reach a representative sample of
this population, this research used a cross-sectional survey design, as outlined below.
Many authors have noted that, within the confines of established constructs,
surveys have shown high reliability in the domains of organizational culture when both
quantitative and qualitative techniques were used (Xenikou and Furnham, 1996; Hofstede
and Neujen, 1990). One of the reasons this is true is that organizational culture is a
phenomenon that persists over time (Schein, 1990). For this reason, a cross-sectional
survey design was determined to be acceptable for accurately measuring the four types of
organizational culture of interest in this research: openness to change/innovation, taskoriented organizational growth, bureaucratic, and competition/confrontation. The
instrument was developed using a mixture of validated research questions and questions
developed based on current research. The instrument was partially validated using both a
pretest and a pilot study.
In the domain of knowledge transfer, no method exists to qualitatively measure
the construct. However, the literature review showed four indicators of knowledge
transfer: relational channels, partner similarity, organizational self-knowledge, and
divergence of interests; further, it gave indications of how to measure those four
indicators. Again, the large sample population favored the decision to use a crosssectional design with a quantitative survey instrument. The instrument was developed
using current research, and partially validated using both a pretest and a pilot study.
It is important to note that the overall instrument (90 questions) was only partially
validated. As noted above, some questions were already validated, but some were
developed based on current research. Only an in-depth qualitative analysis of each of the
39

questions developed in this research effort (e.g. interviews plus questionnaires) and their
relationship to actual organizational culture and knowledge transfer could provide full
validation of how well the questions actually measured the constructs of interest.
Population and Sample
Population
As noted above, the initial population of interest was the more than 8,350 Air
Force units (Hallam, 2001). Because the goal of this study was to explore the
relationship between organizational culture as an indicator of the various environmental
factors influencing knowledge transfer, it was important to access only those
organizations that one would expect to have a discernable organizational culture—or
more precisely organizations whose dominant culture coincided with the organizational
boundaries to be measured. This was important to consider because, as noted in Chapter
2, organizational cultures might exist at numerous levels of an organization (e.g., at the
squadron, group, wing, and major command levels). Also noted in Chapter 2, it is
possible for an organization not to have a discernable culture within its boundaries—
based on the strength of a culture existing at another level, or because a unit has not had
the time to develop a culture yet (Ott, 1989).
Recent research in the Air Force showed that the boundaries of organizational
cultures are likely to coincide with the boundaries of squadrons—where individuals are
likely to be similar, and missions are likely to be focused towards the same goals (Smith,
1998). For this reason, the population of interest was redefined from the 8,350 Air Force
units to the 3,881 active duty Air Force squadrons.
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To implement this population reduction, the author contacted the Air Force Plans
and Programs, Office of Personnel Management. This office provided a database query
of more than 8,350 operational units in the Air Force. From this list, a spreadsheet query
separated the 4,160 squadrons. There were 156 types of squadrons represented in this
listing. Since the query returned squadrons following the standard nomenclature only,
equivalent units such as program offices and research laboratories that did not follow the
standard nomenclature were excluded from further analysis. From this list of squadrons,
another spreadsheet query separated the 279 reserve squadrons from the original list of
4,160 squadrons, leaving 3,881 active duty squadrons. 153 types of squadrons were
represented in this final list of active duty Air Force squadrons.
Sampling Frame 1
Because neither the subpopulations of Air Force Guard and Reserve units were
accessible for the purposes of this survey, their members were excluded from the sample
population. Additionally, Air Force civilian personnel were excluded from the sample
population due to the administrative difficulty of requesting approval from each local
personnel unit to poll its members.
Sampling Frame 2
Next, units unrepresentative of the operational Air Force because of unique or
singular missions were eliminated from the sample population. This was done because
units with unique and singular missions are often small and extremely specialized; their
cultures might not generalize to other squadrons in the Air Force. First, squadron types
from the list of 153 types that had 15 or fewer units categorized under them were
excluded from the sample population. This left 36 types of squadrons. Next, squadron
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types that were likely categorized as squadrons simply because of geographically specific
or otherwise unique missions were excluded from the sample population. There were six
of these squadron types: 1,531 recruiting squadrons, 54 Air Combat Command program
management squadrons, 30 aerospace medicine squadrons, 22 aeromedical dental
squadrons, 142 training squadrons, 9 component repair squadrons, and 27 flying training
squadrons. This left 1,495 squadrons comprising 30 overall squadron types, as shown in
Table 1.
Table 1: Types and Number of Squadrons in the Air Force
Types
Air Base
Air Mobility
Air Refueling
Air Support Operations
Aircraft Generation
Airlift
Civil Engineer
Communications
Comptroller
Contracting
Dental
Equipment Maintenance
Fighter
Flight Test
Intelligence
Logistics Support
Maintenance
Medical Operations
Medical Support
Mission Support
Operations Support
Security Forces
Services
Space Operations
Special Operations
Supply
Test
Transportation
Weather
Total:
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Number in USAF:
16
23
23
35
18
36
88
123
55
64
33
18
88
25
32
66
48
79
74
84
101
96
60
21
18
59
20
60
32
1,495

Sampling Frame 3
The required sample size to achieve a representative sampling of the 1,495
squadrons remaining in the study, using a 90 percent confidence interval with a width of
three-quarters of one point (less than one point on the Likert-type scale), was determined
using Equation 1 (McClave and Benson, 1991:320).
Equation 1 : Sample Size Required to Represent Air Force Squadrons
4⋅ ( z crit ) ⋅ 
2

n
W

R

2


4

2

4⋅ ( 1.645) ⋅ 
2

n :=

( .75)

4

2


 4

2

n = 19.243

Where n =
Zcrit =
R=
W=

Sample size required
Critical z value for a 90% confidence interval (1.645)
Range of values for 5-point Likert-type scale (4)
Width of confidence interval (.75)

The results of this equation required that 20 squadrons be polled. A forty percent return
rate was anticipated, since some squadrons might not return a statistically significant
number of responses due to deployment, leave, problems in contacting, or any other
factor. Accounting for the anticipated return rate required contacting 50 squadrons. One
squadron was added to this number for the pilot study, leaving a requirement to contact
51 squadrons of sufficient size to return statistically significant results.
Sampling Frame 4
The final sampling frame was used to choose a sample size sufficient to represent
each of the squadrons randomly chosen within the types of squadrons using a 90 percent
confidence interval. An example of the equation used to implement this sampling frame
is shown in Equation 2 (HQ USAF/ACM: 11-14). This example uses the information
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collected for the squadron randomly chosen out of the 51 squadrons to be used for the
pilot study.
Equation 2: Determination of Sample Size Required to Represent A Squadron

n

( 2)
2
2
( N − 1) ⋅ ( d ) + ( z ) ⋅ p ⋅ ( 1 − p )
N⋅ z ⋅ p ⋅ ( 1 − p )

Where: n =
N=
p=
d=
z=

n :=

(

)
2
2
( 529 − 1) ⋅ ( .1 ) + ( 1.645 ) ⋅ .5⋅ ( 1 − .5)
2

529⋅ 1.645 ⋅ .5⋅ ( 1 − .5)

n = 60

Sample size required
Population (529)
Maximum sample size factor (.5)
Desired tolerance (.1)
Factor of assurance, 90% confidence (1.645)

Equation 2 was formulated specifically for attitude and opinion surveys, and hence set the
standard for a representative sample above that of conventional analytical statistics. In
this case, for a total population of 529, almost 11 percent of the population was required
to reach the desired statistic—in the example listed in Equation 2 this represented 60
returned surveys. A comparison to more traditional statistics shows that, regardless of
population size, an estimator may be considered normally distributed and representative
of the true population mean to the same tolerance as above if more than about 30 data
points are collected.
In each case, a twenty- five percent return rate was anticipated—and accounted
for. In the example listed in Equation 2, surveys were sent to 240 of the 529 members of
the squadron in order to collect 60 responses. Equation 2 presented a challenge in that it
made surveying squadrons with less than 80 active duty members prohibitive, because
the required response rate was above fifty percent. For this reason, squadrons generated
during random selection with less than 80 active duty members were excluded from the
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survey administration. In their place, alternate squadrons with more than 80 active duty
members, also generated during random selection, were used.
Table 2 lists the number of squadrons contacted by type, the number excluded for
small size, and the number unable to survey.
Table 2: Number of Squadrons Contacted by Type

Types
Air Base
Air Mobility
Air Refueling
Air Support Operations
Aircraft Generation
Airlift
Civil Engineer
Communications
Comptroller
Contracting
Dental
Equipment Maintenance
Fighter
Flight Test
Intelligence
Logistics Support
Maintenance
Medical Operations
Medical Support
Mission Support
Operations Support
Security Forces
Services
Space Operations
Special Operations
Supply
Test
Transportation
Weather
Total Units Contacted:

Number
Contacted
2
2
1
0
0
4
3
6
0
0
0
1
9
0
2
2
2
2
1
1
4
3
0
1
1
2
0
2
0
51

Number
Excluded for Size
0
0
2
2
0
0
2
0
2
3
0
0
0
1
1
3
0
3
6
7
1
1
4
1
0
0
0
0
3
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Number Unable to
Survey
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
7

Fifty-one squadrons were contacted. Forty-two squadrons were excluded for size; underrepresenting air refueling, air support, comptroller, contracting, logistics support, medical
support, mission support, services and weather squadrons in the analysis of results.
Finally, seven squadrons were either not found during a personnel search or were
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consolidated with another unit, and therefore were unable to be surveyed. The
distribution in this category was apparently random.
Survey Development
As identified in Chapter 2, the five types of organizational culture most likely to
be found in organizations are: openness to change/innovation, task-oriented
organizational growth, bureaucratic, and competition/confrontation. None of the four
instruments listed by Xenikou and Furnham were available for use in this research
(Xenikou and Furnham, 1996). For this reason, a previously validated instrument was
sought with similar domains measured. The FOCUS questionnaire (van Muijen,
Koopman, De Witte, De Cock, Susanj, Lemoine, Bourantas, Papalexandris, Branyicski,
Spaltro, Jesuino, Das Neves, Pitariu, Konrad, Peiró, González-Romá and Turnipseed,
1999) captured two of the four types of organizational culture, Openness to
Change/Innovation, and Task-Oriented Organizational Growth. Twenty-three questions
were derived or adapted directly from this source. To capture the other two types of
organizational culture, Bureaucratic and Competition/Confrontation, questions were
devised using the FOCUS questionnaire as a start, with heavy emphasis on the
descriptions of those factors identified in Xenikou and Furnham’s (1996) research.
Twenty- four questions were written in this manner. Finally, a third source of questions
was consulted to assist in phrasing of specific questions to capture items not covered by
the FOCUS questionnaire (Hofstede and Neujen 1990), though none of the questions
were used verbatim.
To capture the four indicators of knowledge transfer, the author used the
descriptions of the indicators given in the original research documents referenced in
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Chapter 2. Ten questions were written based on the research on Relational Channels
(Morey and Frangioso, 1997; Rulke, Za heer, and Anderson, 2000). Ten questions were
written based on the research on Partner Similarity (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Darr and
Kurtzberg, 2000). Twelve questions were written based on the research on
Organizational Self-Knowledge (Moreland and Myaskovsky, 2000; Rulke, Zaheer, and
Anderson, 2000). Finally, eleven questions were written based on the research on
Divergence of Interests (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
Donaldson, 1990).
The initial survey consisted of 90 items using a 5-point Likert-type scale. The 5point scale was chosen to keep the survey consistent with the FOCUS questionnaire,
which used a 5-point Likert-type scale. The 90 items were randomly ordered to reduce
any interaction between similar questions—reducing the ability of the respondent to
guess the expected answers based on previous ones.
The survey collected the following additional data on each respondent: squadron
name (masked from the researcher), rank/grade, highest level of schooling attained, age,
and gender. This data was used to test any effects on the operationalized variables other
than those hypothesized. Finally, the survey gave each respondent the option to add
comments (up to 11,000 characters). Comments were used primarily to find any
potential problems with the survey—whether they be administrative of philosophic.
The survey was implemented using a web-based electronic format. Franke (2001)
showed that as long as an electronic implementation of a survey held true to the intent of
the original survey, and was relatively easy to use, reliability of a survey was not affected
by its electronic implementation. Every response was input directly into a database that
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automatically inverted the responses to the negatively scored questions. The entire
survey as it appeared on the web site for the pilot test, with the exception of the radio
buttons for each Likert-type item selection, is located in Appendix A. The survey as
administered to the entire population was similar to this instrument, except for the 28
deleted questions (noted in Appendix B).
Permission to Conduct Survey
Permission to conduct the survey was requested 21 December 2001. It was
granted by Air Force Personnel Center Surveys Branch 15 January 2002, and was
assigned the survey control number USAF SCN 02-0017, valid until 31 May 2002.
Pre-Test
Ten students enrolled in the Air Force Institute of Technology’s Information
Resources program pre-tested the survey. Each student provided information about how
long the survey took to complete, confusing or misplaced items, as well as misspellings
and format errors. Their input was incorporated into the survey before conducting the
pilot study.
Pilot Study
The pilot study was conducted using one squadron, alias “Maintenance Squadron
1,” and was conducted from 22 to 29 January 2002—before the survey was administered
to the entire sample. The pilot test again identified any confusing or misplaced items, as
well as misspellings and format errors, but also tested the reliability of each question as it
measured the construct of interest. The goal was to achieve at least a .80 reliability
coefficient for each construct, a common standard for academic research (Straub, 1989).

48

As noted in Appendix B, reliability for all constructs except Bureaucratic (.6172) and
Competition/Confrontation (.7179) were brought above .80 by eliminating 28 questions
from the survey.
As noted in Appendix C, factor analysis indicated there were some problems with
construct overlap—but these results could be partially explained if there were, indeed,
high correlations between the constructs. Further, factor analysis sorted out twenty-two
factors—indicating that some questions measured slightly different factors. Overall,
considering the high reliability achieved for most of the questions, this was not seen as a
problem—in fact, it added to the richness of the questions asked—capturing more of the
potential variance. The actual results of the pilot study are listed with the aggregate
results in Appendix D and Appendix E, and are noted by italics.
Survey Administration
The survey was administered from 30 January 2002 to 14 February 2002. An
electronic mail message was generated for each squadron chosen using an organizational
account at the Air Force Institute of Technology. This message held a link to the web
address of the survey, a brief explanation and motivation statement, and encouraged any
questions or comments be sent to the organizational account. A reminder message was
transmitted on 6 February 2002.
One item the pre-test and pilot study’s both failed to identify was a problem with
the scrolling frame containing the Likert-type selections—built to allow users to move
down the list of 90 questions while continually showing the five choices at the top of the
screen. On some browsers, this frame did not resize as the window containing it shrank
to fit the viewable area on different computer screens. This item was identified midway
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through survey administration and corrected by removing the frame. Instead, the five
choices were incorporated into the text of the survey. They were repeated before every
group of eleven questions—ensuring respondents would always have a listing of the five
choices on-screen as they scrolled through the 62- item survey. Users who could not
access the survey or could not view all five options were offered the option of filling out
an electronic document version of the survey. Only one individual took this option. This
individual’s results were then added directly to the database holding the results by the
researcher.
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IV. Analysis and Results
Chapter Overview
This chapter explores the results of the survey described in Chapter 3. Section
one outlines the analytical methods and approach used to interpret the research results.
Section two outlines the results and analysis of the first hypothesis, first for the squadron
unit of analysis, next for the individual perception unit of analysis. Section three outlines
the results and analysis of the second hypothesis, using the same format as section two.
Section four outlines the results and analysis of the third hypothesis, using the same
format as section two. Section five outlines the results and analysis of the fourth
hypothesis, using the same format as section two. Section six out lines the different
demographics collected during the research, and explains their interactions with the
results. Finally, section seven provides an overview of the research results.
Analytical Methods (Statistics)
The survey data described in Chapter 3 were analyzed using two units of analysis:
overall squadron culture and individual perception. Testing the four main hypotheses at
the squadron level was useful to measure interactions where an organizational culture
was likely most measurable, while it was also useful to compare squadron results to
individuals’ perceptions to see if there might be a difference between the two.
Within the overall squadron culture unit of analysis, squadron mean scores were
calculated for each of the 23 squadrons included for each of the eight constructs. The 23
squadrons included in this analysis, representing 1116 responses, were those who met or
exceeded an 88 percent level of confidence, based on Equation 2. This confidence
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interval was used instead of 90 percent because it allowed the inclusion of more
squadrons, which increased the posterior probability of squadrons in the Air Force
multiplied by the members in each squadron (.92 x .88 = .81). Relevant information
regarding each squadron’s size, number required for 90 percent statistical power, actual
number returned, and actual statistical power achieved is listed in Appendix D. Mean
scores for each squadron used in the analysis are listed in Appendix E. Each of the
constructs’ mean scores was used to produce a correlation and linear fit plot
corresponding to each of the sixteen sub-hypotheses. The fit was compared to the sixteen
initial sub-hypotheses, and a determination made whether the empirical data either
supported or did not support each hypothesis. The sub- hypotheses are listed below in
Table 2, to show how each of the 16 fits were run, and expected to turn out.
Table 3: Description of the 16 “Fit Y by X” Tests and Hypothesized Correlations

Openness to
Change/Innovation
Task-Oriented
Organizational Growth
Bureaucratic
Competition/
Confrontation

Relational
Channels

Partner
Similarity

Organizational
Self-Knowledge

Divergence
of Interests

+

+

+

-

+

+

+

-

-

-

-

+

-

-

-

+

Within the second unit of analysis, individual scores were correlated directly for
each of the sixteen sub-hypotheses, ignoring squadron mean scores. This unit of analysis
included 741 additional respondents whose 27 squadrons failed to meet the level of
significance for inclusion in the squadron level of analysis. The total number of
respondents for this item was 1857. Each of the constructs’ mean scores was used to
produce a correlation and linear fit plot corresponding to each of the sixteen sub52

hypotheses. The constructs’ correlation and linear fit then was compared to the initial
hypotheses, and a determination made whether the empirical data either supported, or did
not support those hypotheses.
Finally, reliability and factor analyses were conducted on all 1857 respondents to
confirm questionnaire reliability. Summary results are listed in Appendix F and
Appendix G, and are discussed in each hypothesis section below. An analysis was
conducted on each remaining question represented in Appendix F to investigate whether
any one question or group of questions proved unreliable, much the same as was done in
Appendix B, but this analysis did not return any significant information. Because results
did not show any significant findings, this in-depth analysis is not included.
Hypothesis 1: Openness to Change/Innovation
Overview
Overall, hypothesis one was strongly supported with the data collected, with the
exception of partner similarity, which showed no significant correlation with openness to
change/innovation. In other words, a squadron exhibiting an openness to
change/innovation culture tended to be fertile to the transfer of knowledge.
Each sub- hypothesis result is summarized in the tables below, with the subhypothesis statement appearing above each table. Within each table, the results of the
squadron level of analysis are listed in column a, and the results of the individual
perception level of analysis are shown in column b. Each column contains the
correlational plot, with a fit line and 90 percent oval drawn. Next, each column contains
the respective correlations, the significance value of each correlation, and the number of
units of analysis represented. A critical value (a) of .054 was chosen to represent a 95
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percent level of confidence to two significant digits. Therefore, a significance (p) value
of .054 or lower (meaning there was at least a 95 percent chance that the result was not
due to random chance) was considered significant. Next, each column contains the linear
fit equation for each correlational plot. Finally, the R-square, adjusted R-square, error of
calculation, and mean of response (y-axis) is shown, as well as the number of
observations used in calculating these numbers (same as the number of units of analysis
represented). After each table, a brief explanation of the results is given.
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Hypothesis 1a:
Organizations exhibiting an “openness to change/innovation” organizational culture
will have more relational channels than those not exhibiting an “openness to
change/innovation” organizational culture.
Table 4: Hypothesis 1a Squadron and Individual Results
a. Bivariate Fit of Relational Channels By
Openness to Change/Innovation
(Squadron)

b. Bivariate Fit of Relational Channels By
Openness to Change/Innovation
(Individual)
5
Relational Channels

Relational Channels

4

3.5

3

2.5

4

3

2

1

2
2

2.5

3

3.5

1

4

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

3

4

5

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

Correlation
Correlation
0.941511

2

Openness to Change/Innovation

Openness to Change/Innovation

Correlation
P-value
0.0000

Number
23

Linear Fit

Correlation
0.827727

P-value
0.0000

Number
1857

Linear Fit

Relational Channels = 0.7101252 + 0.835528 Openness to Relational Channels = 0.8774935 + 0.7879738 Openness
Change/Innovation
to Change/Innovation

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

Summary of Fit
0.886443
0.881036
0.066719
3.462609
23

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.685132
0.684963
0.399723
3.476661
1857

Table 4a shows a strong, significant, positive correlation at the squadron level of
analysis between openness to change/innovation and relational channels. This result
tends to support hypothesis 1a.
Table 4b also shows a strong, significant, positive correlation at the individual
perception level of analysis between openness to change/innovation and relational
channels. This result, while not as strong as the result for the squadron unit of analysis,
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seems to indicate an interaction at the individual level as well. It also highlights the fact
that, although organizational cultures may be strong, individual perceptions still vary
from person to person.
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Hypothesis 1b:
Organizations exhibiting an “openness to change/innovation” organizational culture
will have higher partner similarity than those not exhibiting an “openness to
change/innovation” organizational culture.
Table 5: Hypothesis 1b Squadron and Individual Results
a. Bivariate Fit of Partner Similarity By
Openness to Change/Innovation
(Squadron)

b. Bivariate Fit of Partner Similarity By
Openness to Change/Innovation
(Individual)
5

3.5

Partner Similarity

Partner Similarity

4

3

2.5

4

3

2

1

2
2

2.5

3

3.5

1

4

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

3

4

5

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

Correlation
Correlation
0.10089

2

Openness to Change/Innovation

Openness to Change/Innovation

Correlation
P-value
0.6469

Number
23

Correlation
0.303139

P-value
0.0000

Number
1857

Linear Fit

Linear Fit

Partner Similarity = 2.4696152 + 0.1506269 Openness to
Change/Innovation

Partner Similarity = 2.0681819 + 0.2676209 Openness to
Change/Innovation

Summary of Fit

Summary of Fit

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.010179
-0.03696
0.33139
2.965826
23

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.091893
0.091404
0.629531
2.950942
1857

Summary of Fit
0.886443
0.881036
0.066719
3.462609
23

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.685132
0.684963
0.399723
3.476661
1857

Table 5a shows a weak, positive correlation that lacks significance at the
squadron level of analysis between openness to change/innovation and partner similarity.
This result, while int eresting, does not reach a level of significance adequate to lend
support to hypothesis 1b.
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Table 5b shows a weak, significant, positive correlation at the individual
perception level of analysis between openness to change/innovation and partner
similarity. In other words, members who have a perception of an openness to
change/innovation culture in their squadron also seem to recognize an inherent similarity
among squadron members. This difference between individual perception and squadron
units of analys is merits further investigation; perhaps there are different types of
squadrons in the Air Force, ones in which individuals are primarily similar, and ones in
which individuals are primarily dissimilar.
One additional factor that might have contributed to the weak results is the overall
reliability of questions measuring partner similarity of .7533, as shown in Appendix F.
This reliability differed significantly from the initial reliability of .8367 calculated based
on the pilot study, as shown in Append ix B. Finally, as noted in Appendix G, questions
measuring the construct of Partner Similarity tended to load on two separate constructs.
The extent to which these constructs did not overlap might have reduced the accuracy of
this construct.
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Hypothesis 1c:
Organizations exhibiting an “openness to change/innovation” organizational culture
will have more organizational self-knowledge than those not exhibiting an “openness
to change/innovation” organizational culture.
Table 6: Hypothesis 1c Squadron and Individual Results
a. Bivariate Fit of Organizational SelfKnowledge By Openness to
Change/Innovation (Squadron)

b. Bivariate Fit of Organizational SelfKnowledge By Openness to
Change/Innovation (Individual)
Organizational Self-Knowledge

Organizational Self-Knowledge

4

3.5

3

2.5

5

4

3

2

1

2
2

2.5

3

3.5

4

1

2

Openness to Change/Innovation

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

4

5

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

Correlation
Correlation
0.803223

3

Openness to Change/Innovation

Correlation
P-value
0.0000

Number
23

Correlation
0.822465

P-value
0.0000

Number
1857

Linear Fit

Linear Fit

Organizational Self-Knowledge = 0.5096041 + 0.8715848
Openness to Change/Innovation

Organizational Self-Knowledge = 0.7358911 + 0.805144
Openness to Change/Innovation

Summary of Fit

Summary of Fit

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.645167
0.62827
0.144209
3.38087
23

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.676449
0.676274
0.416675
3.391696
1857

Summary of Fit
0.886443
0.881036
0.066719
3.462609
23

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.685132
0.684963
0.399723
3.476661
1857

Table 6a shows a strong, significant, positive correlation at the squadron level of
analysis between openness to change/innovation and organizational self-knowledge. This
result tends to support hypothesis 1c.
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Table 6b also shows a strong, significant, positive correlation at the individual
perception level of analysis between openness to change/innovation and organizational
self-knowledge. This result is, in fact stronger than the result for the squadron unit of
analysis, indicating an interaction between the two constructs at the individual level—
even if the overall squadron results do not represent this relationship as strongly as
individuals perceive it to.
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Hypothesis 1d:
Organizations exhibiting an “openness to change/innovation” organizational culture
will have less divergence of interests than those not exhibiting an “openness to
change/innovation” organizational culture.
Table 7: Hypothesis 1d Squadron and Individual Results
a. Bivariate Fit of Divergence of Interests
By Openness to Change/Innovation
(Squadron)

b. Bivariate Fit of Divergence of Interests
By Openness to Change/Innovation
(Individual)
5
Divergence of Interests

Divergence of Interests

4

3.5

3

2.5

4

3

2

1

2
2

2.5

3

3.5

1

4

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

3

4

5

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

Correlation
Correlation
-0.9337

2

Openness to Change/Innovation

Openness to Change/Innovation

Correlation
P-value
0.0000

Number
23

Correlation
-0.8514

P-value
0.0000

Number
1857

Linear Fit

Linear Fit

Divergence of Interests = 5.6276594 - 0.9425513
Openness to Change/Innovation

Divergence of Interests = 5.0687572 - 0.7747547
Openness to Change/Innovation

Summary of Fit

Summary of Fit

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.8718
0.865695
0.080639
2.522609
23

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.72489
0.724742
0.35715
2.513193
1857

Table 7a shows a strong, significant, negative correlation at the squadron level of
analysis between openness to change/innovation and divergence of interests. This result
tends to support hypothesis 1d.
Table 7b also shows a strong, significant, negative correlation at the individual
perception level of analysis between openness to change/innovation and divergence of
interests. This result, while not as strong as the result for the squadron unit of analysis,
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shows that unit members appear to be aware that a relationship exists between the two
constructs. It also highlights the fact that, although organizational cultures may be
strong, individual perceptions still vary from person to person.

62

Hypothesis 2: Task-Oriented Organizational Growth
Overview
Overall, hypothesis two was strongly supported with the data collected, with the
exception of partner similarity, which showed a moderate but significant correlation with
openness to change/innovation. In other words, a squadron exhibiting a task-oriented
organizational growth culture tended to be fertile to the transfer of knowledge.
Each sub- hypothesis result is summarized in the tables below, with the subhypothesis statement appearing above each table. Within each table, the results of the
squadron level of analysis are listed in column a, and the results of the individual
perception level of analysis are shown in column b. Each column contains the
correlational plot, with a fit line and 90 percent oval drawn. Next, each column contains
the respective correlations, the significance value of each correlation, and the number of
units of analysis represented. A critical value (a) of .054 was chosen to represent a 95
percent level of confidence to two significant digits. Therefore, a significance (p) value
of .054 or lower (meaning there was at least a 95 percent chance that the result was not
due to random chance) was considered significant. Next, each column contains the linear
fit equation for each correlational plot. Finally, the R-square, adjusted R-square, error of
calculation, and mean of response (y-axis) is shown, as well as the number of
observations used in calculating these numbers (same as the number of units of analysis
represented). After each table, a brief explanation of the results is given.
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Hypothesis 2a:
Organizations exhibiting a “task-oriented organizational growth” organizational
culture will have more relational channels than those not exhibiting a “task-oriented
organizational growth” organizational culture.
Table 8: Hypothesis 2a Squadron and Individual Results
a. Bivariate Fit of Relational Channels By
Task -Oriented Organizational Growth
(Squadron)

b. Bivariate Fit of Relational Channels By
Task -Oriented Organizational Growth
(Individual)
5
Relational Channels

Relational Channels

4

3.5

3

2.5

4

3

2

1

2
2

2.5

3

3.5

1

4

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

3

4

5

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

Correlation
Correlation
0.894907

2

Task-Oriented Organizational Growth

Task-Oriented Organizational Growth

Correlation
P-value
0.0000

Number
23

Correlation
0.754766

P-value
0.0000

Number
1857

Linear Fit

Linear Fit

Relational Channels = 0.8196441 + 0.7943572 TaskOriented Organizational Growth

Relational Channels = 0.7740444 + 0.8072902 TaskOriented Organizational Growth

Summary of Fit

Summary of Fit

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.800859
0.791376
0.088353
3.462609
23

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.569671
0.569439
0.467299
3.476661
1857

Table 8a shows a strong, significant, positive correlation at the squadron level of
analysis between task-oriented organizational growth and relational channels. This result
tends to support hypothesis 2a.
Table 8b also shows a strong, significant, positive correlation at the individual
perception level of analysis between task-oriented organizational growth and relational
channels. This result, while not as strong as the result for the squadron unit of analysis,
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shows that unit members appear to be aware that a relationship exists between the two
constructs. It also highlights the fact that, although organizational cultures may be
strong, individual perceptions still vary from person to person.
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Hypothesis 2b:
Organizations exhibiting a “task-oriented organizational growth” organizational
culture will have higher partner similarity than those not exhibiting a “task-oriented
organizational growth” organizational culture.
Table 9: Hypothesis 2b Squadron and Individual Results
a. Bivariate Fit of Partner Similarity By
Task -Oriented Organizational Growth
(Squadron)

b. Bivariate Fit of Partner Similarity By
Task -Oriented Organizational Growth
(Individual)
5

3.5

Partner Similarity

Partner Similarity

4

3

2.5

4

3

2

1

2
2

2.5

3

3.5

1

4

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

3

4

5

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

Correlation
Correlation
0.495233

2

Task-Oriented Organizational Growth

Task-Oriented Organizational Growth

Correlation
P-value
0.0163

Number
23

Linear Fit

Correlation
0.395695

P-value
0.0000

Number
1857

Linear Fit

Partner Similarity = 0.5052156 + 0.7395497 Task-Oriented Partner Similarity = 1.6369685 + 0.3924929 Task-Oriented
Organizational Growth
Organizational Growth

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

Summary of Fit
0.245256
0.209316
0.289375
2.965826
23

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.156574
0.15612
0.606697
2.950942
1857

Table 9a shows a significant, positive correlation at the squadron level of analysis
between task-oriented organizational growth and partner similarity. This result tends to
support hypothesis 2b.
Table 9b also shows a significant, positive correlation at the individual perception
level of analysis between task-oriented organizational growth and partner similarity. This
result, while not as strong as the result for the squadron unit of analysis, shows that unit
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members appear to be aware that a relationship exists between the two constructs. It also
highlights the fact that, although organizational cultures may be strong, individual
perceptions still vary from person to person.
One factor that might have weakened results in this item is the overall reliability
of questions measuring partner similarity of .7533, as shown in Appendix F. This
reliability differed significantly from the initial reliability of .8367 calculated based on
the pilot study, as shown in Appendix B. Finally, as noted in Appendix G, questions
measuring the construct of Partner Similarity tended to load on two separate constructs.
The extent to which these constructs did not overlap might have reduced the accuracy of
this construct.
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Hypothesis 2c:
Organizations exhibiting a “task-oriented organizational growth” organizational
culture will have more organizational self-knowledge than those not exhibiting a
“task-oriented organizational growth” organizational culture.
Table 10: Hypothesis 2c Squadron and Individual Results
a. Bivariate Fit of Organizational SelfKnowledge By Task-Oriented
Organizational Growth (Squadron)

b. Bivariate Fit of Organizational SelfKnowledge By Task-Oriented
Organizational Growth (Individual)
Organizational Self-Knowledge

Organizational Self-Knowledge

4

3.5

3

2.5

5

4

3

2

1

2
2

2.5

3

3.5

4

1

Task-Oriented Organizational Growth

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

3

4

5

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

Correlation
Correlation
0.954252

2

Task-Oriented Organizational Growth

Correlation
P-value
0.0000

Number
23

Correlation
0.80986

P-value
0.0000

Number
1857

Linear Fit

Linear Fit

Organizational Self-Knowledge = -0.065124 + 1.035712
Task-Oriented Organizational Growth

Organizational Self-Knowledge = 0.4096519 + 0.890757
Task-Oriented Organizational Growth

Summary of Fit

Summary of Fit

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.910597
0.90634
0.072386
3.38087
23

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.655874
0.655688
0.42972
3.391696
1857

Table 10a shows a strong, significant, positive correlation at the squadron level of
analysis between task-oriented organizatio nal growth and organizational self-knowledge.
This result tends to support hypothesis 2c.
Table 10b also shows a strong, significant, positive correlation at the individual
perception level of analysis between task-oriented organizational growth and
organizational self-knowledge. This result, while not as strong as the result for the
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squadron unit of analysis, shows that unit members appear to be aware that a relationship
exists between the two constructs. It also highlights the fact that, although organizational
cultures may be strong, individual perceptions still vary from person to person.
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Hypothesis 2d:
Organizations exhibiting a “task-oriented organizational growth” organizational
culture will have less divergence of interests than those not exhibiting a “taskoriented organizational growth” organizational culture.
Table 11: Hypothesis 2d Squadron and Individual Results
a. Bivariate Fit of Divergence of Interests
By Task -Oriented Organizational Growth
(Squadron)

b. Bivariate Fit of Divergence of Interests
By Task -Oriented Organizational Growth
(Individual)

4

Divergence of Interests

Divergence of Interests

5
3.5

3

2.5

4

3

2

1

2
2

2.5

3

3.5

4

1

Task-Oriented Organizational Growth

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

3

4

5

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

Correlation
Correlation
-0.9419

2

Task-Oriented Organizational Growth

Correlation
P-value
0.0000

Number
23

Correlation
-0.82214

P-value
0.0000

Number
1857

Linear Fit

Linear Fit

Divergence of Interests = 5.6869339 - 0.951055 TaskOriented Organizational Growth

Divergence of Interests = 5.3271708 - 0.8405544 TaskOriented Organizational Growth

Summary of Fit

Summary of Fit

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.887184
0.881812
0.075646
2.522609
23

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.675911
0.675737
0.387641
2.513193
1857

Table 11a shows a strong, significant, negative correlation at the squadron level of
analysis between task-oriented organizational growth and divergence of interests. This
result tends to support hypothesis 2d.
Table 11b also shows a strong, significant, negative correlation at the individual
perception level of analysis between task-oriented organizational growth and divergence
of interests. This result, while not as strong as the result for the squadron unit of analysis,
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shows that unit members appear to be aware that a relationship exists between the two
constructs. It also highlights the fact that, although organizational cultures may be
strong, individual perceptions still vary from person to person.
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Hypothesis 3: Bureaucratic
Overview
Overall, hypothesis three was not supported with the data collected. In other
words, there does not appear to be a correlation between a squadron exhibiting a
bureaucratic culture and one that is fertile to the transfer of knowledge.
Results may have been weakened by the reliability of the instrument used to
measure the construct of bureaucratic culture, initially shown in Appendix B to be .6172
based on the pilot study, and shown Appendix F to be .3575 once all results were
tabulated. In this case, where only 7 of every 20 questions asked in this area were in
agreement and only 5 questions were asked, it is clear that this instrument was either
poorly worded or interpreted quite differently from individual to individual. An
exploration of whether eliminating more questions would have increased overall
reliability showed this was not the case.
It is also possible that the assumptions about bureaucratic culture were incorrect,
and that bureaucratic cultures do address one or more of agency costs and transaction
costs. In the case of agency costs, it is possible that a bureaucratic organization addresses
them by its very structure—increasing overall monitoring of agent behavior. It is also
possible that a bureaucratic organization addresses transaction costs by providing a
standard framework for generating the answers to questions—in essence acting as a
surrogate for complete market information. Considering these two possibilities, it is
further made clear that individual perception of what the questions were measuring might
have been swayed by these alternate interpretations of what was meant by the concept of
“bureaucracy.” For example, questions such as “the chain of command is important”
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might have directly contradicted with ones such as “conflict is avoided at all costs,” even
though they both attempted to measure the same construct.
Each sub- hypothesis result is summarized in the tables below, with the subhypothesis statement appearing above each table. Within each table, the results of the
squadron level of analysis are listed in column a, and the results of the individual
perception level of analysis are shown in column b. Each column contains the
correlational plot, with a fit line and 90 percent oval drawn. Next, each column contains
the respective correlations, the significance value of each correlation, and the number of
units of analysis represented. A critical value (a) of .054 was chosen to represent a 95
percent level of confidence to two significant digits. Therefore, a significance (p) value
of .054 or lower (meaning there was at least a 95 percent chance that the result was not
due to random chance) was considered significant. Next, each column contains the linear
fit equation for each correlational plot. Finally, the R-square, adjusted R-square, error of
calculation, and mean of response (y-axis) is shown, as well as the number of
observations used in calculating these numbers (same as the number of units of analysis
represented). After each table, a brief explanation of the results is given.
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Hypothesis 3a:
Organizations exhibiting a “bureaucratic” organizational culture will have fewer
relational channels than those not exhibiting a “bureaucratic” organizational culture.
Table 12: Hypothesis 3a Squadron and Individual Results
a. Bivariate Fit of Relational Channels
By Bureaucratic
(Squadron)

b. Bivariate Fit of Relational Channels
By Bureaucratic
(Individual)
5
Relational Channels

Relational Channels

4

3.5

3

2.5

4

3

2

1

2
2

2.5

3

3.5

1

4

2

Bureaucratic

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

4

5

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

Correlation
Correlation
-0.17067

3
Bureaucratic

Correlation
P-value
0.4362

Number
23

Correlation
0.02301

P-value
0.3217

Number
1857

Linear Fit

Linear Fit

Relational Channels = 4.2580824 - 0.2766405
Bureaucratic

Relational Channels = 3.3908818 + 0.02983 Bureaucratic

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

Summary of Fit
0.029129
-0.0171
0.195084
3.462609
23

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.000529
-9.33e-6
0.712164
3.476661
1857

Table 12a shows a weak, negative correlation that lacks significance at the
squadron level of analysis between bureaucratic and relational channels. Though
interesting, this result is not strong enough to lend support hypothesis 3a, especially
considering the questionable reliability of the bureaucratic questions (.3575). What is
somewhat surprising is that Air Force squadrons as a whole do not appear overly
bureaucratic (mean score less than 3). Again, this result is tempered by the lack of
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overall reliability of the measure used, in addition to the apparent confusion generated by
this lack of reliability.
Table 12b also shows no significant correlation at the individual perception level
of analysis between bureaucratic and relational channels. These results indicate that not
only is there significant variance in individual perception of bureaucratic cultures but also
that the Air Force as a whole sees itself as less bureaucratic. The weak correlation at the
squadron level of analysis and lack of any correlation at the individual perception level of
analysis may be because the bureaucratic questions did not achieve the desired level of
reliability, and therefore did not accurately measure the construct in question. Recall that
the inter-question reliability of the bureaucratic questions was .3575, meaning that only 7
of every 20 responses recorded for this construct agreed. Only a thorough analysis of this
construct using a reliable instrument can determine whether the above results were
actually significant or not.
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Hypothesis 3b:
Organizations exhibiting a “bureaucratic” organizational culture will have lower
partner similarity than those not exhibiting a “bureaucratic” organizational culture.
Table 13: Hypothesis 3b Squadron and Individual Results
a. Bivariate Fit of Partner Similarity
By Bureaucratic
(Squadron)

b. Bivariate Fit of Partner Similarity
By Bureaucratic
(Individual)

4

3.5

Partner Similarity

Partner Similarity

5

3

2.5

4

3

2

1

2
2

2.5

3

3.5

4

1

2

Bureaucratic

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

4

5

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

Correlation
Correlation
0.029661

3
Bureaucratic

Correlation
P-value
0.8931

Number
23

Correlation
0.281448

P-value
0.0000

Number
1857

Linear Fit

Linear Fit

Partner Similarity = 2.73325 + 0.0808826 Bureaucratic

Partner Similarity = 1.9779392 + 0.3383644 Bureaucratic

Summary of Fit

Summary of Fit

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.00088
-0.0467
0.332943
2.965826
23

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.079213
0.078717
0.633911
2.950942
1857

Table 13a shows no significant correlation at the squadron level of analysis
between bureaucratic and partner similarity. This result does not lend support to
hypothesis 3b. This result is unsurprising, considering the questionable reliability of the
bureaucratic questions (.3575). What is somewhat surprising is that Air Force squadrons
as a whole do not appear overly bureaucratic (mean score less than 3). Again, this result
is tempered by the lack of overall reliability of the measure used, in addition to the
apparent confusion generated by this lack of reliability.
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Table 13b also shows a weak, significant, positive correlation at the individual
perception level of analysis between bureaucratic and partner similarity. These results
appear to directly contradict the original hypothesis. Indeed, on the aggregate, the
construct of partner similarity did not behave as expected. Perhaps this was because, as
hypothesized earlier, there is a mixture of different types of squadrons in the Air Force—
those in which the members are primarily similar, and those in which the members were
primarily dissimilar.
The lack of correlation at the squadron level of analysis and weak correlation at
the individual perception level of analysis may be because the bureaucratic questions did
not achieve the desired level of reliability, and therefore did not accurately measure the
construct in question. Recall that the inter-question reliability of the bureaucratic
questions was .3575, meaning that only 7 of every 20 responses recorded for this
construct agreed. Only a thorough analysis of this construct using a reliable instrument
can determine whether the above results were actually significant or not.
One additional factor that might have contributed to the weak results is the overall
reliability of questions measuring partner similarity of .7533, as shown in Appendix F.
This reliability differed significantly from the initial reliability of .8367 calculated based
on the pilot study, as shown in Appendix B. Finally, as noted in Appendix G, questions
measuring the construct of Partner Similarity tended to load on two separate constructs.
The extent to which these constructs did not overlap might have reduced the accuracy of
this construct.
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Hypothesis 3c:
Organizations exhibiting a “bureaucratic” organizational culture will have less
organizational self-knowledge than those not exhibiting a “bureaucratic”
organizational culture.
Table 14: Hypothesis 3c Squadron and Individual Results
a. Bivariate Fit of Organizational SelfKnowledge By Bureaucratic
(Squadron)

b. Bivariate Fit of Organizational SelfKnowledge By Bureaucratic
(Individual)
Organizational Self-Knowledge

Organizational Self-Knowledge

4

3.5

3

2.5

5

4

3

2

1

2
2

2.5

3

3.5

4

1

2

Bureaucratic

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

4

5

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

Correlation
Correlation
-0.00558

3
Bureaucratic

Correlation
P-value
0.9798

Number
23

Correlation
0.090214

P-value
0.0001

Number
1857

Linear Fit

Linear Fit

Organizational Self-Knowledge = 3.4126736 - 0.0110604
Bureaucratic

Organizational Self-Knowledge = 3.0458626 + 0.1202645
Bureaucratic

Summary of Fit

Summary of Fit

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.000031
-0.04759
0.242087
3.38087
23

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.008139
0.007604
0.729545
3.391696
1857

Table 14a shows no significant correlation at the squadron level of analysis
between bureaucratic and organizational self-knowledge. This result does not lend
support to hypothesis 3c. This result is unsurprising, considering the questionable
reliability of the bureaucratic questions (.3575). What is somewhat surprising is that Air
Force squadrons as a whole do not appear overly bureaucratic (mean score of less than 3).
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Again, this result is tempered by the lack of overall reliability of the measure used, in
addition to the apparent confusion generated by this lack of reliability.
Table 14b also shows a weak, significant, positive correlation at the individual
perception level of analysis between bureaucratic and organizational self-knowledge.
The lack of significant correlation at the squadron level of analysis and weak correlation
at the individual perception level of analysis may be because the bureaucratic questions
did not achieve the desired level of reliability, and therefore did not accurately measure
the construct in question. Recall that the inter-question reliability of the bureaucratic
questions was .3575, meaning that only 7 of every 20 responses recorded for this
construct agreed. Only a thorough analysis of this construct using a reliable instrument
can determine whether the above results were actually significant or not.
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Hypothesis 3d:
Organizations exhibiting a “bureaucratic” organizational culture will have more
divergence of interests than those not exhibiting a “bureaucratic” organizational
culture.
Table 15: Hypothesis 3d Squadron and Individual Results
a. Bivariate Fit of Divergence of Interests
By Bureaucratic
(Squadron)

b. Bivariate Fit of Divergence of Interests
By Bureaucratic
(Individual)

4

Divergence of Interests

Divergence of Interests

5
3.5

3

2.5

4

3

2

1

2
2

2.5

3

3.5

4

1

2

Bureaucratic

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

4

5

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

Correlation
Correlation
0.07509

3
Bureaucratic

Correlation
P-value
0.7335

Number
23

Correlation
-0.05313

P-value
0.0220

Number
1857

Linear Fit

Linear Fit

Divergence of Interests = 2.1245005 + 0.1384494
Bureaucratic

Divergence of Interests = 2.7025234 - 0.0658401
Bureaucratic

Summary of Fit

Summary of Fit

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.005638
-0.04171
0.224581
2.522609
23

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.002823
0.002285
0.679962
2.513193
1857

Table 15a shows a weak positive correlation that lacks significance at the
squadron level of analysis between bureaucratic and divergence of interests. This result
does not lend support to hypothesis 3d. This result is unsurprising, considering the
questionable reliability of the bureaucratic questions (.3575). What is somewhat
surprising is that Air Force squadrons as a whole do not appear overly bureaucratic (mean
score of less than 3).

Again, this result is tempered by the lack of overall reliability of
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the measure used, in addition to the apparent confusion generated by this lack of
reliability.
Table 15b also shows an extremely weak, significant, negative correlation at the
individual perception level of analysis between bureaucratic and divergence of interests.
The lack of significant correlation at the squadron level of analysis and weak correlation
at the individual perception level of analysis may be because the bureaucratic questions
did not achieve the desired level of reliability, and therefore did not accurately measure
the construct in question. Recall that the inter-question reliability of the bureaucratic
questions was .3575, meaning that only 7 of every 20 responses recorded for this
construct agreed. Only a thorough analysis of this construct using a reliable instrument
can determine whether the above results were actually significant or not.
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Hypothesis 4: Competition/Confrontation
Overview
Overall, hypothesis four was moderately supported with the data collected, with
the exception of partner similarity, which showed no significant correlation with
competition/confrontation. In other words, a squadron exhibiting a
competition/confrontation culture tended to be infertile to the transfer of knowledge.
Results may have been weakened by the reliability of the instrument used to measure the
construct of competition/confrontation, initially shown in Appendix B to be .7179 based
on the pilot study, and shown Appendix F to be .6422 once all results were tabulated.
Each sub- hypothesis result is summarized in the tables below, with the subhypothesis statement appearing above each table. Within each table, the results of the
squadron level of analysis are listed in column a, and the results of the individual
perception level of analysis are shown in column b. Each column contains the
correlational plot, with a fit line and 90 percent oval drawn. Next, each column contains
the respective correlations, the significance value of each correlation, and the number of
units of analysis represented. A critical value (a) of .054 was chosen to represent a 95
percent level of confidence to two significant digits. Therefore, a significance (p) value
of .054 or lower (meaning there was at least a 95 percent chance that the result was not
due to random chance) was considered significant. Next, each column contains the linear
fit equation for each correlational plot. Finally, the R-square, adjusted R-square, error of
calculation, and mean of response (y-axis) is shown, as well as the number of
observations used in calculating these numbers (same as the number of units of analysis
represented). After each table, a brief explanation of the results is given.
82

Hypothesis 4a:
Organizations exhibiting a “competition/confrontation” organizational culture will
have fewer relational channels than those not exhibiting a
“competition/confrontation” organizational culture.
Table 16: Hypothesis 4a Squadron and Individual Results
a. Bivariate Fit of Relational Channels By
Competition/Confrontation
(Squadron)

b. Bivariate Fit of Relational Channels By
Competition/Confrontation
(Individual)

4

Relational Channels

Relational Channels

5
3.5

3

2.5

4

3

2

1

2
2

2.5

3

3.5

4

1

2

Competition/Confrontation

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

4

5

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

Correlation
Correlation
-0.62579

3

Competition/Controntation

Correlation
P-value
0.0014

Number
23

Correlation
-0.36413

P-value
0.0000

Number
1857

Linear Fit

Linear Fit

Relational Channels = 5.769458 - 0.7817524
Competition/Confrontation

Relational Channels = 4.7849043 - 0.4443095
Competition/Confrontation

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

Summary of Fit
0.391612
0.362641
0.15443
3.462609
23

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.132591
0.132124
0.663448
3.476661
1857

Table 16a shows a significant negative correlation at the squadron level of
analysis between competition/confrontation and relational channels. This result tends to
support hypothesis 4a.
Table 16b also shows a weak, significant, negative correlation at the individual
perception level of analysis between competition/confrontation and relational channels.
This result, while not as strong as the result for the squadron unit of analysis, shows that
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unit members appear to be aware that a relationship exists between the two constructs. It
also highlights the fact that, although organizational cultures may be strong, individual
perceptions still vary from person to person. The weak correlation at the individual
perception level of analysis may be because the competition/confrontation questions did
not achieve the desired level of reliability, and therefore did not accurately measure the
construct in question. Recall that the reliability of the competition/confrontation
questions was .6422, meaning that only 13 of every 20 responses recorded for this
construct agreed.
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Hypothesis 4b:
Organizations exhibiting a “competition/confrontation” organizational culture will
have lower partner similarity than those not exhibiting a “competition/confrontation”
organizational culture.
Table 17: Hypothesis 4b Squadron and Individual Results
a. Bivariate Fit of Partner Similarity By
Competition/Confrontation
(Squadron)

b. Bivariate Fit of Partner Similarity By
Competition/Confrontation
(Individual)
5

3.5

Partner Similarity

Partner Similarity

4

3

2.5

4

3

2

1

2
2

2.5

3

3.5

1

4

2

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

4

5

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

Correlation
Correlation
0.26859

3

Competition/Confrontation

Competition/Confrontation

Correlation
P-value
0.2153

Number
23

Correlation
0.033861

P-value
0.1447

Linear Fit

Linear Fit

Partner Similarity = 1.3001118 + 0.5644825
Competition/Confrontation

Partner Similarity = 2.8381218 + 0.0383163
Competition/Confrontation

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

Number
1857

Summary of Fit
0.07214
0.027957
0.32085
2.965826
23

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.001147
0.000608
0.660236
2.950942
1857

Table 17a shows a weak positive correlation that lacks significance at the
squadron level of analysis between competition/confrontation and partner similarity.
This result does not lend support to hypothesis 4b; indeed, this result appears to directly
contradict hypothesis 4b.
Table 17b also shows no significant correlation at the individual perception level
of analysis between competition/confrontation and partner similarity. The weak
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correlation at the squadron level of analysis and lack of correlation at the individual
perception level of analysis may be because the competition/confrontation questions did
not achieve the desired level of reliability, and therefore did not accurately measure the
construct in question. Recall that the reliability of the competition/confrontation
questions was .6422, meaning that only 13 of every 20 responses recorded for this
construct agreed. However, in this case, as in two of the previous three cases, partner
similarity did not behave as expected. As hypothesized previously, this could be because
there is a mixture of different types of squadrons in the Air Force—those in which the
members are primarily similar, and those in which the members were primarily
dissimilar.
One additional factor that might have contributed to the weak results is the overall
reliability of questions measuring partner similarity of .7533, as shown in Appendix F.
This reliability differed significantly from the initial reliability of .8367 calculated based
on the pilo t study, as shown in Appendix B. Finally, as noted in Appendix G, questions
measuring the construct of Partner Similarity tended to load on two separate constructs.
The extent to which these constructs did not overlap might have reduced the accuracy of
this construct.
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Hypothesis 4c:
Organizations exhibiting a “competition/confrontation” organizational culture will
have less organizational self-knowledge than those not exhibiting a
“competition/confrontation” organizational culture.
Table 18: Hypothesis 4c Squadron and Individual Results
a. Bivariate Fit of Organizational SelfKnowledge By Competition/Confrontation
(Squadron)

b. Bivariate Fit of Organizational SelfKnowledge By Competition/Confrontation
(Individual)
Organizational Self-Knowledge

Organizational Self-Knowledge

4

3.5

3

2.5

5

4

3

2

1

2
2

2.5

3

3.5

1

4

Competition/Confrontation

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

3

4

5

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

Correlation
Correlation
-0.40874

2

Competition/Confrontation

Correlation
P-value
0.0528

Number
23

Correlation
-0.37335

P-value
0.0000

Number
1857

Linear Fit

Linear Fit

Organizational Self-Knowledge = 5.2232289 - 0.6243446
Competition/Confrontation

Organizational Self-Knowledge = 4.7710457 - 0.4684591
Competition/Confrontation

Summary of Fit

Summary of Fit

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.167067
0.127403
0.220945
3.38087
23

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.139388
0.138924
0.679564
3.391696
1857

Table 18a shows a significant negative correlation at the squadron level of
analysis between competition/confrontation and organizational self-knowledge. This
result tends to support hypothesis 4c.
Table 18b also shows a weak, significant, negative correlation at the individual
perception level of analysis between competition/confrontation and organizational selfknowledge. This result, while not as strong as the result for the squadron unit of analysis,
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shows that unit members appear to be aware that a relationship exists between the two
constructs. It also highlights the fact that, although organizational cultures may be
strong, individual perceptions still vary from person to person. The weak correlation at
the individual perception level of analysis may be because the competition/confrontation
questions did not achieve the desired level of reliability, and therefore did not accurately
measure the construct in question. Recall that the reliability of the
competition/confrontation questions was .6422, meaning that only 13 of every 20
responses recorded for this construct agreed.

88

Hypothesis 4d:
Organizations exhibiting a “competition/confrontation” organizational culture will
have more divergence of interests than those not exhibiting a
“competition/confrontation” organizational culture.
Table 19: Hypothesis 4d Squadron and Individual Results
a. Bivariate Fit of Divergence of Interests By
Competition/Confrontation
(Squadron)

b. Bivariate Fit of Divergence of Interests
By Competition/Confrontation
(Individual)

4

Divergence of Interests

Divergence of Interests

5
3.5

3

2.5

4

3

2

1

2
2

2.5

3

3.5

4

1

Competition/Confrontation

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

3

4

5

Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.900
Linear Fit

Correlation
Correlation
0.645043

2

Competition/Confrontation

Correlation
P-value
0.0009

Number
23

Correlation
0.386921

P-value
0.0000

Number
1857

Linear Fit

Linear Fit

Divergence of Interests = -0.182227 + 0.9166233
Competition/Confrontation

Divergence of Interests = 1.1844031 + 0.4512879
Competition/Confrontation

Summary of Fit

Summary of Fit

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.41608
0.388274
0.172099
2.522609
23

RSquare
RSquare Adjusted
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Weights)

0.149708
0.149249
0.627888
2.513193
1857

Table 19a shows a positive, significant correlation at the squadron level of
analysis between competition/confrontation and divergence of interests. This result tends
to support hypothesis 4d.
Table 19b also shows a weak, significant, positive correlation at the individual
perception level of analysis between competition/confrontation and divergence of
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interests. This result, while not as strong as the result for the squadron unit of analysis,
shows that unit members appear to be aware that a relationship exists between the two
constructs. It also highlights the fact that, although organizational cultures may be
strong, individual perceptions still vary from person to person. . The weak correlation at
the individual perception level of analysis may be because the competition/confrontation
questions did not achieve the desired level of reliability, and therefore did not accurately
measure the construct in question. Recall that the reliability of the
competition/confrontation questions was .6422, meaning that only 13 of every 20
responses recorded for this construct agreed.
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Demographics
Summary information for the demographics collected is listed in Table 20.
Table 20: Respondent Demographic Information
Demographic
Total Number of
% of Total
Gender
Male
Female
TOTAL:

1475
382
1857

79.4%
20.6%
100%

TOTAL:

105
385
385
373
418
166
20
5
1857

5.7%
20.7%
20.7%
20.1%
22.5%
8.9%
1.1%
0.3%
100%

TOTAL:

2
10
202
215
449
350
260
44
16
28
61
132
45
31
3
1
6
1
1
1857

0.1%
0.5%
10.9%
11.6%
24.2%
18.8%
14.0%
2.4%
0.9%
1.5%
3.3%
7.1%
2.4%
1.7%
0.2%
0.1%
0.3%
0.1%
0.1%
100%

Education Level
High School
Associates
CCAF
Bachelors
Post-Graduate
Masters
Doctoral or Post-Doctoral
TOTAL:

792
295
312
261
58
125
14
1857

42.6%
15.9%
16.8%
14.1%
3.1%
6.7%
0.8%
100%

Age
> 21
21-25
26-30
31-35
36-40
41-45
46-50
50 <
Rank
AB
Amn
A1C
SrA
SSgt
TSgt
MSgt
SMSgt
CMSgt
2d Lt
1st Lt
Capt
Maj
Lt Col
Col
Gen
Other
GS 0-10
GS 11-14
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To determine whether there were any confo unding effects of demographics, an
analysis of means and variances was conducted for each of the four demographics. An
example of a test is enclosed in Appendix H, for gender; however, each of the tests
conducted is not included because of their length, and overall lack of significance found.
Instead, a summary of the tests and general trends noticed are given in Table 21.
Table 21: Results of Demographic-Based Means/Variances Analysis
Demographic
Gender

Age

Rank

Educational Level

Results
Females consistently scored slightly lower than Males on every construct;
except for the questions measuring divergence of interests (which were
negatively scored). Results did not exceed .05 of one Likert-type point,
and were therefore not significant.
Younger respondents consistently showed a lower opinion of squadron
cultures than other age groups (e.g. younger respondents saw their
squadrons as more bureaucratic, and with a higher divergence of
interests). This general trend was excepted on the organizational culture
construct of task-oriented organizational growth, for which there was no
difference in mean scores between age groups. This general trend was
reversed on the knowledge transfer construct of partner similarity—with
younger respondents tending to see themselves as more similar to
knowledge transfer partners than older respondents. Interestingly,
younger respondents tended to see their squadron as having less
organizational self-knowledge than older respondents did. One might
argue this is because younger respondents would tend to have less
organizational self-knowledge than older respondents do. There were not
enough results for the age groups < 21, 46-50, and 50 < to analyze their
results. In each case, mean scores did not differ markedly (by more than
.5 of one Likert-type point).
Individuals will less rank appeared to show a lower opinion of squadron
cultures and factors indicating knowledge transfer than individuals with
more rank; however, the results were inconsistent from factor to factor and
they varied considerably, with responses ranging widely across the Likerttype scale.
Individuals with lower education levels consistently showed a lower
opinion of squadron cultures and factors indicating knowledge transfer
than individuals with higher education levels (e.g. lower education levels
saw their squadrons as more bureaucratic, and with a higher divergence
of interests). Quite markedly, High School, Associates, and Community
College of the Air Force results clumped together, with Bachelors, PostGraduate, and Masters also clumping together. There were not enough
results for Doctoral and Post-doctoral individuals to analyze their results.
In each case, mean scores did not differ markedly (by more than .5 of one
Likert-type point).
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Conclusion
Table 22 summarizes the conclusions reached after analysis of the research. Ten
of the sixteen hypotheses were supported, while six were not supported.
Table 22: Description of the 16 “Fit Y by X” Tests and Actual Correlations

Openness to
Change/Innovation
Task-Oriented
Organizational Growth
Bureaucratic
Competition/
Confrontation

Relational
Channels

Partner
Similarity

Organizational
Self-Knowledge

Divergence
of Interests

+

0

+

-

+

+

+

-

0

0

0

0

-

0

-

+

The low reliability of the survey instrument may explain the lack of correlation in the
Bureaucratic construct. The low reliability of the survey instrument in Bureaucratic and
Competition/Confrontation may also explain the lack of significant results in two of the
four instances of Partner Similarity, though this result may also be because squadrons in
the Air Force are a mixture of primarily similar and primarily dissimilar units. Clearly
more research on the construct of Partner Similarity is required before drawing any firm
conclusions about this construct.
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V. Conclusion and Recommendations
Research Question
Upon completing the research, the answer to the research question, “is there a
correlation between types of organizational culture and factors influencing knowledge
transfer,” appears to be a qualified yes, there is a correlation between some types of
organizational culture and some factors influencing knowledge transfer.
Research Question Discussion
According to Kachigan (1986), when it exis ts between two constructs, correlation
provides the following three pieces of information. First, correlation serves a descriptive
function, showing how things appear to be in reality. Second, correlation serves a
predictive function, possibly allowing the measurement of a surrogate construct to predict
an unknown second, but correlated, construct. Third, it provides the capability to
examine how much of the variance of one variable accounts for variance in a second,
correlated variable. One item he fur ther notes, in caution, is that correlation, “does not
imply causality.” (Kachigan, 1986:213)
Having established a correlational relationship between types of organizational
culture and factors influencing knowledge transfer, this research lays the ground work for
academics interested in the interaction between organizational culture and other
variables. Perhaps most importantly, the ability to link together a theory of how
individuals behave in a group setting to a theory of how individuals behave as separate
entities will spur further research into how the two units of measurement interact.
Further, this research provides a view of the link between group and individual
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dynamics—that of the rather obscure theory of organizational economics. Perhaps this
theory will continue to receive attention commensurate with its importance in future
academic research.
Having established a correlational relationship between types of organizational
culture and factors influencing knowledge transfer, this research lays the groundwork for
practitioners interested in possible ways to increase knowledge transfer in their
organizations. First, because the constructs of organizational culture and knowledge
transfer appear to be correlated, the practitioner can attempt to measure one of the two
constructs, then make educated inferences about the state of the other construct in his or
her organization. This can reduce the time and cost burden of measuring constructs of
interest when considering implementing knowledge management projects. Second, once
an organization is measured, the practitioner can best decide how to proceed. As outlined
in Chapter 1, this decision is a critical one considering the failure of many recent
knowledge management efforts—and the costs associated with them.
This research appears to lend support to some practitioners’ caution that,
“Organizational learning is a long-term activity that will build competitive advantage
over time and requires sustained management attention, commitment, and effort.” (Go h,
1998:15) Put another way, if a relationship exists between organizational culture and
knowledge transfer, there may not be any “quick fixes” to an organization that does not
have a culture fertile to knowledge transfer. The solution is probably not to try to capture
as much as one can about an employee’s mind before the employee walks out the door; at
this point it is probably too late. Instead, building an organizational culture fertile to
knowledge transfer begins with senior leadership—and a commitment towards changing
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culture the only way it has been shown to change: slowly. Even if there is no direct
causal relationship between knowledge transfer and organizational culture, one might
argue a management change effort directed at changing an organization’s culture is a
good place to start—with potential trickle-down benefits in the area of knowledge
transfer. Until such a causal relationship is proven, one might argue this is still the best
place to start.
However, one basic truth about organizational culture is it sometimes proves
unwieldy to manage, and is therefore “frequently overlooked or misunderstood.” (Vesta,
Fralix, and Spreier, 1997) Considering the long-term consequences of failing to properly
manage an organizational culture, it is probably advisable to try; however, any attempt to
manage organizational culture must begin with full management commitment to take the
time and put forth the effort to understand it. One researcher advises, “The issue for
senior management, then, is not choosing the ‘correct’ basic assumptions, but identifying
those that will promote the most successful organizational performance.” (Young,
2000:20). Another warns that organizations may fail to create a unique, desired culture if
there is a discrepancy between “what we say” and “what we do.” (Kyung-Koo, 2000)
Limitations
As mentioned above, one limitation of correlational research is that it cannot
prove causation. In this case, though there appears to be a correlation between
organizational culture types and indicators of knowledge transfer, one can only guess if
one of the constructs actually causes the other. At the same time, it is also possible that a
third construct or group of constructs causes both of the constructs to act the way they do.
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Another limitation of the research performed is that even though a correlation is
shown between organizational culture types and indicators of knowledge transfer, there is
no empirical evidence to show that the indicators of knowledge transfer actually predict
any significant level of transfer of knowledge. Only further confirmatory research can
hope to show this essential link between theory and reality.
Another limitation to the research performed, as mentioned in Chapter 2, is the
inherent problem with attempting to measure the constructs of organizational culture and
knowledge transfer through a cross-sectional, self-report survey instrument. Previous
culture research has shown anecdotal information suggesting a high correlation between
culture scores and emp loyee disenfranchisement (Key, 1999). In other words, the entire
construct of culture is continually confounded in measurement by employee satisfaction.
Again, only further confirmatory research separating culture from satisfaction can hope to
show this essential link between theory and reality.
Finally, a limitation that only partially affected the research was the fact that two
organizational culture constructs, Bureaucratic (.6172) and Competition/Confrontation
(.7179), did not exhibit a strong inter-question reliability. In the case of Bureaucratic, the
results were inconclusive, while in the case of Competition/Confrontation, the results
may be either understated or overstated. Future efforts must pay close attention to the
validation of instruments used to measure constructs of interest.
Future Research
This research is preliminary in nature, and has the limitations expressed above.
For these reasons, this research exposes several additional areas for further research.
First, a subsequent study might study the behavior of the two constructs of organizational
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culture and knowledge transfer in a longitudinal study, to establish a precedent for how to
interpret the correlation shown in this research with respect to an actual organization.
Second, a subsequent study might explore the two constructs of organizational culture
and knowledge transfer in a qualitative study, to confirm the link hypothesized in this
research between the constructs measured and the actual constructs of interest. Such a
study might also revisit the constructs of Bureaucratic and Competition/Confrontation to
establish a stronger sense of their correlations to knowledge transfer, as well as searching
for a proper relationship between organizational culture and the construct of Partner
Similarity. Third, a subsequent study might wish to revisit the assumptions made in this
paper as to how different organizational cultures account for the two organizational
economic costs: agency costs and transaction costs. Fourth, a subseque nt study might
attempt to manipulate one of the two constructs of organizational culture and knowledge
transfer in an attempt to show any causal relationship that may exist between the
constructs. Fifth, a subsequent study might attempt to measure different types of
squadrons, such as squadrons identifying themselves as primarily similar and those
identifying themselves as primarily dissimilar, to see whether there are differences
between them in organizational culture and knowledge transfer. Sixth, a subsequent
study might attempt to investigate whether the Air Force as an organization exhibits an
overall type of organizational culture and general trend as to knowledge transfer
indicators. Finally, once the above studies are accomplished, a final step in this vein of
research might attempt to give the practitioner important advice about how to treat the
constructs of organizational culture and knowledge transfer with respect to each other in
order to ensure the success of future knowledge management efforts.
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Conclusion
This research indicates a correlation exists between some types of organizational
culture and some factors influencing knowledge transfer. In doing so, it bridges the gap
between the somewhat ethereal and group-centered theory of organizational culture and
the equally ethereal, but individually centered theory of knowledge transfer—clearing up
an apparent contradiction between the two theories.
In one sense, this research appears to confirm what both academics and
practitioners alike have stated about the importance of considering organizational culture
when implementing knowledge management projects. In another sense, the research asks
new questions, such as, “if organizational culture and knowledge transfer are correlated,
what can a manager do to make sure organizational culture is taken into account when
proposing a knowledge management project?” Indeed, the answer to this question might
prove as important to the academic as to the practitioner.
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Appendix A: Survey Instrument

The Squadron Culture Questionnaire (SCQ)
Explanation:

Welcome to the SCQ. This survey is being conducted for two reasons: (1) to measure
unit culture in the Air Force and determine how culture may affect a unit's capability to
transfer knowledge internally, in concert with research sponsored by the Air Force Chief
Information Officer's Information & Knowledge Management Division and (2) to fulfill a
research requirement for completion of a student thesis through the Air Force Institute of
Technology, Department of Engineering and Management. Your responses will be
combined with the responses of other members of your organization and aggregated with
other similar organizations to determine how organizations in your mission area compare
to organizations in other mission areas.
This research is approved by the Air Force Survey Branch with survey control
number USAF SCN 02-013 which expires 31 May 2002.
Several steps have been taken to protect your anonymity. First, you will not be asked to
provide your name at any time. Second, your questionnaire responses will be entered
directly into a database programmed such that there is no way of determining from whom
the information is being sent. Finally, your organization's name is used only to fit each
response with an organization type, and will not be used in any reports generated.
Instructions:
•
•
•

The SCQ should take 10-15 minutes to complete, and consists of three areas:
Area 1: Choose your squadron from the drop-down box.
Area 2: Indicate your level of agreeme nt with the 63 short statements, (from
Completely Disagree to Completely Agree). Answer on behalf of your squadron (or
equivalent unit). You may use the mouse to select the circle representing your answer
to each item, or tab between items and use the "up" arrow to select the first circle, and
"down" to select/move through the remaining 4 circles.
• Area 3: Demographic information. Your answers to these four questions are used only
to assess the validity of the overall results.
• Finally, you are given the option to provide feedback (in about 50 words or less) to the
authors of this survey. We welcome your comments and any suggestions for
improvement.
• Each item only allows one answer, and each of the 63 items must be answered.
• The term "section" refers to your individual work unit below the squadron level (e.g.,
flight, element, or section, as applicable).
• Press The link to Survey page 1 below to begin:
Survey Page 1
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The SCQ
Squadron You Are Currently Assigned to:
Please indicate your level of agreement with the
statements below. Answer on behalf of your squadron
(or equivalent unit):

Strongly
Disagree Disagree Indifferent

1. My squadron . . . is comprised of people with similar
trade skills
2. In my squadron . . . people have a "meeting of the
minds" to ask questions and give explanations
3. In my squadron . . . Every single section is essential to
mission accomplishment
4. In my squadron . . . change is blocked
5. In my squadron . . . individuals share similar career
fields
6. In my squadron . . . rewards are dependent on
performance
7. In my squadron . . . people who wish to advance are
supported by their superiors
8. In my squadron . . . objectives are clear
9. In my squadron . . . people rely on other people to
answer questions
10. My squadron is . . . task-oriented
11. In my squadron . . . coworkers regularly ask each other
for assistance
12. In my squadron . . . decision-making is centralized
13. In my squadron . . . the chain of command is the most
important
14. In my squadron . . . in wartime, the entire unit deploys
15. In my squadron . . . managers express concern about
employees’ personal problems
16. In my squadron . . . management practices allow
freedom in work
17. In my squadron . . . management specifies the targets
to be attained
18. In my squadron . . . cautious, incremental improvement
is stressed
19. My squadron . . . encourages participation from all
members
20. In my squadron . . . people learn how to perform tasks
by asking other people
21. My squadron . . . changes its priorities to "keep the
peace"
22. In my squadron . . . people rely on documents to
answer questions
23. In my squadron . . . members oppose each other
24. In my squadron . . . new ideas about work organization
are encouraged
25. In my squadron . . . there are hard criteria against which
job performance is measured
26. In my squadron . . . every section is located in close
physical proximity to every other section
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Agree

Strongly
Agree

27. In my squadron . . . every section serves the same
customer
28. In my squadron . . . the typical member takes initiative
29. In my squadron . . . constructive criticism is accepted
30. In my squadron . . . employees seem aware of their role
in the organization
31. In my squadron . . . trade-based affiliations are
important
32. My squadron is . . . comfortable in unfamiliar situations
33. In my squadron . . . every section shares a singular
focus
34. In my squadron . . . problems are noticed and dealt with
immediately
35. In my squadron . . . people with personal problems are
helped
36. My squadron . . . passes the blame for failure
37. My squadron . . . does a good job of assessing its
shortcomings
38. In my squadron . . . people have an informal style of
dealing with each other
39. In my squadron . . . there are winners and losers
40. My squadron . . . searches for new opportunities in the
external environment
41. In my squadron . . . people seem to know how their role
fits into the overall mission
42. In my squadron . . . excellence is demanded
43. In my squadron . . . everyone is similar
44. My squadron . . . makes the best use of the employee
skills to develop better products/services
45. In my squadron . . . individual innovation is rewarded
46. In my squadron . . . competitiveness between sections
is measured
47. In my squadron . . . people seem to know each other's
roles
48. In my squadron . . . people are willing to learn new
things
49. My squadron . . . is very knowledgeable about skills
required for our job, compared to the best of our peers
50. In my squadron . . . criticism is not well-taken
51. My squadron . . . rewards desired behavior
52. In my squadron . . . members play "devil's advocate" to
each other
53. In my squadron . . . individuals share similar interests
54. In my squadron . . . cooperation is the most important
55. In my squadron . . . mistakes are tolerated
56. In my squadron . . . individual appraisal is directly
related to the attainment of goals
57. In my squadron . . . people know where to go to resolve
task-specific questions outside their area of expertise
58. In my squadron . . . people are willing to share what
they know
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59. In my squadron . . . the typical member is forceful with
opinions
60. In my squadron . . . conflict is avoided at all costs
61. In my squadron . . . members argue about the best
solution
62. My squadron . . . never settles for less than the
absolute best solution
63. In my squadron . . . performance measurement is
common
64. In my squadron . . . goals are often unachievable
65. In my squadron . . . people tend to pull in many different
directions
66. In my squadron . . . communication is two-way
67. In my squadron . . . members know where to go for help
68. In my squadron . . . personal contacts are important
69. In my squadron . . . people from functionally diverse
sections know each other
70. In my squadron . . . personal responsibility is stressed
71. In my squadron . . . individuals know enough about their
own abilities to ask for assistance when they require it
72. My squadron is . . . extremely conservative
73. In my squadron . . . managers seem aware of the skill
level of their employees
74. In my squadron . . . over time, individuals share similar
experiences
75. My squadron . . . expends resources to encourage
employees to share what they know
76. In my squadron . . . junior members learn from senior
members
77. In my squadron . . . the typical member is direct
78. My squadron is . . . "win-lose" oriented
79. In my squadron . . . mentorship is important
80. In my squadron . . . it is clear how performance will be
evaluated
81. My squadron . . . respects the opinions of senior
members
82. In my squadron . . . the typical member pleases others
83. In my squadron . . . person-to-person discussions are
common
84. In my squadron . . . the tried and true methods are
questioned
85. In my squadron . . . people are open to criticism
86. In my squadron . . . failure is accepted
87. In my squadron . . . overall, the sections perform a
singular functional mission
88. In my squadron . . . people work within the constraints
of their job description
89. In my squadron . . . section goals are in-line with the
organization's mission and goals
90. In my squadron . . . competition is encouraged or
rewarded

103

Demographic Information:
Rank/Grade:
Highest Level of Schooling Attained:
Age:
Gender:
(Optional) Please Add Any Comments:

Complete!
Your results are now recorded.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATON!
Explanation of Appendix A
1. Radio buttons provided for selection are not shown; one radio button was provided
per question for each choice (strongly disagree, disagree, indifferent, agree, strongly
agree).
2. The construct measured for each question is listed in Appendix B, as is the reliability
analysis for each construct. Questions were removed as noted in appendix B to
increase inter-question reliability.
3. The factor analysis for each question/construct is listed in Appendix C.
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Appendix B: Pilot Test Reliability Data
Reliability Analysis for Openness to Change/Innovation (I) Questions
Note: Indicates Question Removed
Reliability Coefficients:
First Run:
Last Run:

N of Cases = 66.0
N of Cases = 66.0

N of Items = 13
N of Items = 10

Alpha = .8853
Alpha = .8987

Item-Total Statistics:
Question Number
First Run:
Q07
Q15
Q16
Q24
Q28
Q29
Q32
Q35
Q40
Q44
Q55
Q85
Q86
Last Run:
Q07
Q15
Q16
Q24
Q28
Q29
Q35
Q40
Q44
Q85

Scale Mean if Item
Deleted

Scale Variance if
Item Deleted

Corrected ItemTotal Correlation

Alpha if Item
Deleted

38.2576
38.5000
38.4545
38.5758
38.8485
38.7576
38.8333
38.3939
38.6970
38.6818
39.0152
38.9545
39.6667

58.5019
56.1308
57.1748
59.3557
54.8690
56.0942
59.4026
57.7193
59.2298
54.7741
60.7228
55.3671
62.1333

.5803
.6293
.6234
.5250
.7136
.6744
.4652
.5738
.5675
.7682
.3183
.7415
.2875

.8766
.8738
.8742
.8792
.8690
.8714
.8822
.8768
.8774
.8663
.8909
.8679
.8903

29.8636
30.1061
30.0606
30.1818
30.4545
30.3636
30.0000
30.3030
30.2879
30.5606

41.1965
39.0501
40.3963
42.1818
38.4979
39.3427
40.4923
42.1221
38.2082
39.2655

.6068
.6640
.6196
.5260
.7073
.6839
.6010
.5651
.7821
.7044

.8912
.8876
.8904
.8959
.8845
.8861
.8917
.8937
.8793
.8848
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Reliability Analysis for Task-Oriented Organizational Growth (T) Questions
Note: Indicates Question Removed
Reliability Coefficients:
First Run:
Last Run:

N of Cases = 66.0
N of Cases = 66.0

N of Items = 10
N of Items = 9

Alpha = .8866
Alpha = .8964

Item-Total Statistics:
Question Number
First Run:
Q06
Q08
Q10
Q17
Q18
Q25
Q46
Q56
Q63
Q80
Last Run:
Q06
Q08
Q10
Q17
Q18
Q25
Q56
Q63
Q80

Scale Mean if Item
Deleted

Scale Variance if
Item Deleted

Corrected ItemTotal Correlation

Alpha if Item
Deleted

30.6061
30.2879
30.0000
30.1061
30.4242
30.5000
30.6212
30.4394
30.3636
30.4697

32.8886
35.2235
35.5077
36.5578
36.3096
35.4538
38.9774
35.1117
36.5427
33.7914

.7420
.5888
.6851
.5564
.6832
.6553
.3123
.7084
.6113
.7015

.8660
.8782
.8713
.8799
.8724
.8731
.8964
.8695
.8764
.8693

27.4697
27.1515
26.8636
26.9697
27.2879
27.3636
27.3030
27.2273
27.3333

29.0529
30.8690
31.4734
32.6145
32.2082
31.4042
31.1683
32.4245
29.5487

.7359
.6188
.6834
.5380
.6843
.6553
.6992
.6121
.7302

.8787
.8885
.8832
.8938
.8840
.8851
.8819
.8884
.8790
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Reliability Analysis for Bureaucratic (B) Questions
Note: Indicates Question Removed
Reliability Coefficients:
First Run:
Last Run:

N of Cases = 66.0
N of Cases = 66.0

N of Items = 13
N of Items = 5

Alpha = .2546
Alpha = .6172

Item-Total Statistics:
Question Number
First Run:
Q04
Q12
Q13
Q21
Q36
Q38
Q60
Q70
Q72
Q77
Q82
Q84
Q88
Last Run:
Q04
Q12
Q21
Q60
Q88

Scale Mean if Item
Deleted

Scale Variance if
Item Deleted

Corrected ItemTotal Correlation

Alpha if Item
Deleted

35.8636
35.2576
34.7576
35.5303
35.9091
35.6667
35.6818
36.3182
35.2424
35.7576
35.3182
35.5152
35.3636

13.7503
13.9172
16.3711
13.1452
14.6993
16.3179
12.8357
17.8510
15.1096
17.6019
15.6972
17.0536
12.6657

.2691
.1852
-.0707
.3062
.1283
-.0490
.3663
-.2501
.1102
-.2206
.0291
-.1487
.3349

.1539
.1864
.2989
.1261
.2175
.2864
.0978
.3630
.2272
.3466
.2588
.3206
.1021

12.2273
11.6212
11.8939
12.0455
11.7273

8.8245
8.6389
7.6655
8.3517
7.4629

.3120
.2667
.4692
.3588
.4576

.5912
.6171
.5111
.5693
.5149
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Reliability Analysis for Competition/Confrontation (C) Questions
Note: Indicates Question Removed
Reliability Coefficients:
First Run:
Last Run:

N of Cases = 66.0
N of Cases = 66.0

N of Items = 11
N of Items = 6

Alpha = .5908
Alpha = .7179

Item-Total Statistics:
Question Number
First Run:
Q23
Q42
Q50
Q52
Q54
Q59
Q61
Q62
Q64
Q78
Q90
Last Run:
Q23
Q50
Q59
Q61
Q64
Q78

Scale Mean if Item
Deleted

Scale Variance if
Item Deleted

Corrected ItemTotal Correlation

Alpha if Item
Deleted

31.0303
30.0909
31.0152
30.8485
31.3788
31.0152
30.7879
30.6515
31.3939
30.8788
30.4545

15.4452
18.7916
16.4459
17.0228
18.7312
15.2152
15.4005
18.9075
16.1809
16.8159
18.0979

.3857
.0597
.3489
.2920
.0214
.5113
.4499
-.0209
.4102
.2902
.1399

.5332
.6044
.5467
.5603
.6195
.5055
.5188
.6348
.5338
.5600
.5914

14.6818
14.6667
14.6667
14.4394
15.0455
14.5303

8.6818
10.2564
9.8564
9.0193
9.8902
9.9760

.5306
.3589
.4109
.5395
.4560
.4079

.6529
.7055
.6912
.6508
.6785
.6918
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Reliability Analysis for Relational Channels (R) Questions
Note: Indicates Question Removed
Reliability Coefficients:
First Run:
Last Run:

N of Cases = 66.0
N of Cases = 66.0

N of Items = 10
N of Items = 6

Alpha = .7139
Alpha = .8225

Item-Total Statistics:
Question Number
First Run:
Q02
Q09
Q20
Q22
Q31
Q66
Q68
Q76
Q79
Q83
Last Run:
Q02
Q66
Q68
Q76
Q79
Q83

Scale Mean if Item
Deleted

Scale Variance if
Item Deleted

Corrected ItemTotal Correlation

Alpha if Item
Deleted

29.9091
29.7879
29.7273
30.7424
30.0303
30.0758
29.4697
29.6364
29.7273
29.5303

18.5147
24.3235
20.3245
24.5634
20.5221
17.3942
19.3298
18.2657
17.5245
19.0221

.4877
-.1356
.3429
-.1639
.3370
.5491
.5427
.5719
.6470
.6139

.6703
.7623
.6966
.7662
.6974
.6561
.6666
.6559
.6400
.6569

17.4697
17.6364
17.0303
17.1970
17.2879
17.0909

12.5606
12.3580
13.9375
12.1298
12.0235
13.4993

.5623
.5095
.5115
.6963
.6838
.6174

.8006
.8169
.8098
.7708
.7730
.7918
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Reliability Analysis for Partner Similarity (S) Questions
Note: Indicates Question Removed
Reliability Coefficients:
First Run:
Last Run:

N of Cases = 66.0
N of Cases = 66.0

N of Items = 10
N of Items = 9

Alpha = .8358
Alpha = .8367

Item-Total Statistics:
Question Number
First Run:
Q01
Q03
Q05
Q14
Q26
Q27
Q43
Q53
Q74
Q87
Last Run:
Q01
Q05
Q14
Q26
Q27
Q43
Q53
Q74
Q87

Scale Mean if Item
Deleted

Scale Variance if
Item Deleted

Corrected ItemTotal Correlation

Alpha if Item
Deleted

26.2273
25.4697
26.4697
27.7879
27.2424
27.4091
27.0303
26.7121
26.3485
26.3030

35.7476
40.5914
37.3914
39.2466
35.6019
34.3685
36.1837
37.6235
36.5075
36.8298

.6245
.3311
.4841
.4045
.5696
.4997
.5919
.5958
.6666
.5675

.8111
.8367
.8250
.8315
.8165
.8289
.8144
.8160
.8091
.8170

22.0303
22.2727
23.5909
23.0455
23.2121
22.8333
22.5152
22.1515
22.1061

32.2145
33.8322
34.8916
31.4594
30.3235
32.3872
33.8536
32.6536
32.9270

.5963
.4510
.4358
.5954
.5172
.5856
.5785
.6647
.5678

.8143
.8301
.8308
.8142
.8288
.8155
.8181
.8091
.8177
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Reliability Analysis for Organizational Self-Knowledge (K) Questions
Note: Indicates Question Removed
Reliability Coefficients:
First Run:
Last Run:

N of Cases = 66.0
N of Cases = 66.0

N of Items = 12
N of Items = 9

Alpha = .9149
Alpha = .9116

Item-Total Statistics:
Question Number
Last Run:
Q11
Q30
Q34
Q37
Q41
Q47
Q49
Q57
Q67
Q69
Q71
Q73
Last Run:
Q30
Q34
Q37
Q41
Q47
Q49
Q57
Q67
Q73

Scale Mean if Item
Deleted

Scale Variance if
Item Deleted

Corrected ItemTotal Correlation

Alpha if Item
Deleted

37.5000
37.6818
37.9545
37.8485
37.7121
37.9545
37.8939
37.6515
37.5152
37.9848
37.6061
37.5303

56.5615
52.4357
51.3671
52.3767
52.7005
52.8441
51.3886
52.7228
54.8690
53.9228
55.2578
52.8068

.4810
.7598
.6974
.7029
.7382
.6747
.6955
.7032
.6486
.5296
.6011
.6623

.9148
.9033
.9060
.9057
.9043
.9070
.9061
.9057
.9085
.9142
.9103
.9075

27.2727
27.5455
27.4394
27.3030
27.5455
27.4848
27.2424
27.1061
27.1212

32.9399
31.8825
33.0193
33.3221
33.3594
32.0998
33.0788
34.9578
33.3389

.7643
.7177
.6919
.7234
.6665
.6966
.7151
.6432
.6527

.8970
.9002
.9018
.8998
.9036
.9019
.9002
.9054
.9046
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Reliability Analysis for Divergence of Interests (D) Questions
Note: Indicates Question Removed
Reliability Coefficients:
First Run:
Last Run:

N of Cases = 66.0
N of Cases = 66.0

N of Items = 11
N of Items = 8

Alpha = .6373
Alpha = .8420

Item-Total Statistics:
Question Number
First Run:
Q19
Q33
Q39
Q45
Q48
Q51
Q58
Q65
Q75
Q81
Q89
Last Run:
Q19
Q45
Q48
Q51
Q58
Q75
Q81
Q89

Scale Mean if Item
Deleted

Scale Variance if
Item Deleted

Corrected ItemTotal Correlation

Alpha if Item
Deleted

34.2727
35.0758
34.7727
34.6818
34.7273
34.6970
34.3939
34.7424
34.9848
34.4242
34.2879

20.1399
19.8249
27.0091
18.1587
18.8476
18.8914
18.6424
29.0557
18.4767
18.0634
20.7620

.3665
.3827
-.3708
.5481
.5202
.5367
.6026
-.5381
.6004
.5175
.5275

.6000
.5960
.7322
.5564
.5671
.5651
.5538
.7616
.5520
.5613
.5879

24.5455
24.9545
25.0000
24.9697
24.6667
25.2576
24.6970
24.5606

22.6517
19.7671
21.1692
20.7991
21.0256
21.1788
20.7068
23.7886

.4133
.6875
.5808
.6531
.6569
.6101
.5311
.5091

.8431
.8077
.8225
.8133
.8133
.8188
.8311
.8334
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Appendix C: Pilot Test Factor Analysis—Rotated Component Matrix
Q#
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
-.361-.352.496
B (4)
.854
B (12)
.643
B (13)
-.458
B (21)
-.704
B (36)
-.549
-.356
B (38)
.843
B (60)
-.525
B (70)
.872
B (72)
-.402
-.655
B (77)
B (82)
-.772
B (84)
.512
.419
B (88)
-.388
C (23)
.402
C (42) .376 .576
-.802
C (50)
-.825
C (52)
C (54) -.451
.809
C (59)
.694
C (61)
.387
-.353
.422
C (62)
-.357
.353-.381
-.445
C (64)
.475.368
C (78)
.439
.476
C (90)
D (19) -.800
-.467
D (33) -.355
.613
D (39)
-.433-.403
D (45)
D (48) -.700
-.396
-.498
D (51)
-.475
D (58)
.381
D (65)
-.424
D (75)
-.694
D (81)
-.765
D (89)
.534
I (7)
.450
.520
I (15)
.397
.357
.374
I (16)
.385
.391
I (24)
I (28) .552
.470
.368
I (29)
.778
I (32)
.709
I (35)
.392 .356
.427
I (40)
.526
I (44) .457
.812
I (55)
.468
I (85)
.628
I (86)
.381
.439
K (11)
K (30) .656 .370
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K (34)
K (37)
K (41)
K (47)
K (49)
K (57)
K (67)
K (69)
K (71)
K (73)
R (2)
R (9)
R (20)
R (22)
R (31)
R (66)
R (68)
R (76)
R (79)
R (83)
S (1)
S (3)
S (5)
S (14)
S (26)
S (27)
S (43)
S (53)
S (74)
S (87)
T (6)
T (8)
T (10)
T (17)
T (18)
T (25)
T (46)
T (56)
T (63)
T (80)

.584
.687
.453
.426
.452
.371
.441 .433

.365

.497
.754

.384 .481
.489
.428

.382

.384
.390
.765

.371
-.817
.521
.373 .497
.518
.452

.470
.377
.363

.391

.441

.381
.702
.673
.722
.765
.360
.652
.818

.679

.607
.457
.420
.484

.519
.418

.672
.415
.402
.432

.514
.416
.626 .403
.526
.358
.631 .357 .375

.374
.531
.457
.427

Note: Indicates Question Removed
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Explanation of Appendix C:
1. The constructs abbreviations are defined as follows:
I: Openness to Change/Innovation
T: Task-Oriented Organizational Growth
B: Bureaucratic
C: Competition/Confrontation
R: Relational Channels
S: Partner Similarity
K: Organizational Self-Knowledge
D: Divergence of Interests
2. In parenthesis next to each construct abbreviation is the number of the question.
3. Loadings are shown with boxes. In some cases, a group of questions loaded on more
than one factor.
4. Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
5. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 49
iterations.
6. Cutoff for factor loadings: .35. (Note, this partially or completely eliminated the
loadings for some factors and questions.)
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Appendix D: Return Rates for Units Surveyed

SQUADRON ?
Air Base Sq 1
Air Base Sq A2
Air Mobility Sq 1
Air Mobility Sq 2
Air Refueling Sq 2
Airlift Sq 1
Airlift Sq 2
Airlift Sq A4
Airlift Sq A5
Civil Engineering Sq 1
Civil Engineering Sq 3
Civil Engineering Sq A5
Communications Sq 1
Communications Sq 2
Communications Sq A3
Communications Sq A4
Communications Sq A5
Communications Sq A6
Equipment Maintenance Sq 1
Fighter Sq 1
Fighter Sq 2
Fighter Sq 3
Fighter Sq A4
Fighter Sq A5
Fighter Sq A6
Fighter Sq A7
Fighter Sq A8
Fighter Sq A9
Intelligence Sq 1
Intelligence Sq A3
Logistics Support Sq 1
Logistics Support Sq A3
Maintenance Sq 1
Maintenance Sq 2
Medical Operations Sq A4
Medical Operations Sq A5
Medical Support Sq A7
Mission Support Sq 1
Operations Support Sq 1
Operations Support Sq 3
Operations Support Sq 4
Operations Support Sq 5
Security Forces Sq 1
Security Forces Sq A3
Security Forces Sq A5
Space Operations Sq A3
Special Operations Sq 1
Supply Sq 1
Supply Sq A2
Transportation Sq 1
Transportation Sq 2
TOTAL (Not including pilot)

Personnel
Listed
91
238
123
315
84
403
94
232
202
256
313
333
355
250
126
376
108
228
564
303
271
228
298
244
317
238
289
328
339
315
105
93
529
491
128
202
172
86
184
107
142
167
149
214
85
171
163
127
156
149
151
11632

E-mails
Sent
91
211
123
223
84
232
94
210
202
215
223
225
228
214
126
230
108
209
242
222
217
209
221
213
224
211
220
225
226
223
105
93
240
238
128
202
172
86
184
107
142
167
149
206
85
171
163
127
156
149
151
9122

E-mails
Rejected
6
203
122
13
5
41
8
52
17
66
80
66
28
18
12
14
16
36
31
27
125
123
68
29
43
140
70
24
226
28
5
6
78
31
16
13
44
10
28
16
8
11
68
170
18
15
26
17
27
29
41
2414
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Effective
Size
85
35
1
302
79
362
86
180
185
190
233
267
327
232
114
362
92
192
533
276
146
105
230
215
274
98
219
304
113
287
100
87
451
460
112
189
128
76
156
91
134
156
81
44
67
156
137
110
129
120
110
9218

Surveys
Completed
35
0
1
56
17
30
15
33
26
33
20
53
48
63
43
78
24
56
43
48
9
57
40
64
32
32
25
57
15
69
30
26
66
48
40
34
25
17
36
39
65
44
24
25
11
37
29
47
41
24
27
1857

Statistical
Power
89.27%

90.06%
85.60%
87.02%
85.01%
86.95%
82.38%
89.87%
89.02%
91.14%
90.06%
91.74%
85.49%
90.73%
87.96%
89.19%
92.60%
88.15%
91.36%
86.31%
88.01%
84.48%
90.16%
91.36%
87.37%
86.41%
90.64%
88.75%
89.53%
87.19%
85.19%
87.94%
89.99%
92.65%
89.46%
85.83%

88.15%
86.39%
90.88%
89.35%
84.92%
86.19%
--

Explanation of Appendix D:
1. The number of surveys sent was based on the smaller of either the number of
personnel listed in each squadron times four or the number of personnel listed in each
squadron.
2. The effective size of a squadron was based on the number of personnel listed in each
squadron minus the number of rejected e- mails. In any case where this difference left
an effective size of fewer than 40, the squadron’s results were eliminated from further
analysis (indicated by a dash “--”).
3. Statistical power was calculated using Equation 2, and based on the effective squadron
size. This mitigated the effects of the rejected e-mails, which might have been caused
by personnel turnover or an outdated Air Force personnel system listing.
4. Squadrons listed in boldface met the statistical power required (88%) and were
included in the squadron analysis.
5. The squadron listed in italics was used for the pilot study, and was therefore not
included in either the squadron analysis or the individual perception analysis.
6. Statistical power for Squadrons with fewer than 10 responses and an effective size of
less than 40 was not calculated, and those squadrons were eliminated from further
consideration in the squadron analysis.
7. Individual responses from all squadrons except the squadron listed in italics were used
for the individual perception analysis.
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Appendix E: Squadron Average Responses for Each Construct
SQUADRON ? VARIABLE ?
Air Base Sq 1
Air Base Sq A2
Air Mobility Sq 1
Air Mobility Sq 2
Air Refueling Sq 2
Airlift Sq 1
Airlift Sq 2
Airlift Sq A4
Airlift Sq A5
Civil Engineering Sq 1
Civil Engineering Sq 3
Civil Engineering Sq A5
Communications Sq 1
Communications Sq 2
Communications Sq A3
Communications Sq A4
Communications Sq A5
Communications Sq A6
Equipment Maintenance Sq 1
Fighter Sq 1
Fighter Sq 2
Fighter Sq 3
Fighter Sq A4
Fighter Sq A5
Fighter Sq A6
Fighter Sq A7
Fighter Sq A8
Fighter Sq A9
Intelligence Sq 1
Intelligence Sq A3
Logistics Support Sq 1
Logistics Support Sq A3
Maintenance Sq 1
Maintenance Sq 2
Medical Operations Sq A4
Medical Operations Sq A5
Medical Support Sq A7
Mission Support Sq 1
Operations Support Sq 1
Operations Support Sq 3
Operations Support Sq 4
Operations Support Sq 5
Security Forces Sq 1
Security Forces Sq A3
Security Forces Sq A5
Space Operations Sq A3
Special Operations Sq 1
Supply Sq 1
Supply Sq A2
Transportation Sq 1
Transportation Sq 2

I
2.697
-3.200
3.202
3.412
3.627
3.100
3.667
3.250
3.124
3.185
3.219
3.306
3.430
3.319
3.504
3.667
3.182
3.047
3.113
3.233
3.218
3.568
2.944
2.938
3.553
3.468
3.154
3.480
3.703
3.337
3.304
3.358
3.319
3.255
3.150
3.520
3.035
3.581
3.397
3.417
3.089
2.929
3.124
2.445
3.354
3.521
3.472
3.354
3.067
3.200

T
2.632
-2.667
3.361
3.379
3.589
3.363
3.697
3.355
3.279
3.267
3.344
3.211
3.444
3.183
3.433
3.713
3.143
3.217
3.329
3.432
3.470
3.594
3.179
3.215
3.639
3.671
3.296
3.474
3.581
3.189
3.248
3.402
3.442
3.122
3.173
3.444
3.346
3.451
3.387
3.345
3.051
3.181
3.262
2.626
3.526
3.563
3.447
3.366
3.120
3.407

B
2.914
-2.600
2.732
2.882
2.820
2.787
2.776
2.869
3.030
3.150
2.864
2.813
2.921
3.056
2.744
2.917
2.850
2.902
2.896
2.711
3.154
2.780
2.844
2.875
2.750
2.888
2.723
2.893
2.733
2.960
2.977
2.976
2.900
2.840
2.976
2.848
3.118
2.622
3.082
2.871
2.755
2.775
2.816
2.327
2.957
2.779
2.991
2.966
2.808
3.037
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C
3.157
-3.500
2.854
2.882
2.872
3.067
2.662
2.891
3.010
2.967
3.019
2.861
2.802
2.934
2.808
2.708
2.878
3.112
3.163
3.259
3.175
2.979
3.318
2.984
2.771
2.880
3.135
2.789
2.795
2.733
2.878
2.934
2.858
2.904
3.034
2.527
3.108
2.653
2.803
2.923
3.140
3.264
3.027
3.167
2.842
2.960
2.897
2.854
3.056
3.062

R
2.810
-2.667
3.378
3.529
3.811
3.111
3.909
3.494
3.288
3.617
3.478
3.444
3.566
3.415
3.575
3.882
3.414
3.229
3.424
3.278
3.430
3.633
3.242
3.344
3.729
3.733
3.404
3.589
3.877
3.472
3.276
3.457
3.524
3.396
3.382
3.593
3.353
3.736
3.521
3.492
3.345
3.382
3.340
2.727
3.491
3.661
3.532
3.520
3.313
3.327

S
2.502
-2.333
2.990
3.458
3.544
2.948
3.350
3.239
3.098
2.972
2.851
2.553
2.734
2.840
2.731
2.769
2.817
2.711
3.280
3.309
3.458
3.494
3.377
3.243
3.441
3.298
3.390
3.141
2.908
2.485
2.714
2.830
3.074
2.892
2.824
2.711
3.268
2.142
3.006
2.340
2.639
2.995
2.929
2.646
3.150
3.249
2.967
2.780
2.866
2.564

K
2.660
-2.667
3.494
3.654
3.767
3.237
3.835
3.350
3.333
3.367
3.296
3.255
3.409
3.253
3.446
3.759
3.111
3.214
3.301
3.296
3.616
3.717
3.354
3.323
3.747
3.760
3.329
3.281
3.684
3.359
3.103
3.418
3.435
3.203
3.222
3.489
3.209
3.522
3.578
3.412
3.101
3.120
3.204
2.556
3.474
3.705
3.506
3.379
3.051
3.284

D
3.257
-3.750
2.522
2.412
2.196
2.767
2.095
2.481
2.712
2.606
2.594
2.589
2.421
2.532
2.370
2.161
2.634
2.584
2.688
2.681
2.476
2.281
2.771
2.742
2.223
2.205
2.544
2.467
2.192
2.617
2.707
2.453
2.380
2.609
2.570
2.335
2.640
2.260
2.407
2.538
2.713
2.734
2.605
3.375
2.361
2.384
2.391
2.527
2.880
2.616

Explanation of Appendix E:
1. The constructs abbreviations are defined as follows:
I: Openness to Change/Innovation
T: Task-Oriented Organizational Growth
B: Bureaucratic
C: Competition/Confrontation
R: Relational Channels
S: Partner Similarity
K: Organizational Self-Knowledge
D: Divergence of Interests
2. Squadron mean scores were calculated first for each individual for each construct, by
adding the Likert-type responses for each question measuring a construct, then
dividing by the total questions measuring that construct. (For example, to measure an
individual’s mean score for the construct “Openness to Change/Innovation,” the
Likert-type responses were added for questions 7, 15, 16, 24, 28, 29, 35, 40, 44, and
85, then divided by 10.) Next, each individual response for each construct was added
with the other individual responses for the squadron, and divided by the total number
of personnel in their squadron who completed the survey (there were no incomplete
surveys).
3. Individual perception mean scores were calculated the same as above for each
construct. Next, each individual’s response for each construct was added with the
other individual responses, and divided by the total number of personnel who
completed the survey.
4. Squadrons listed in boldface met the statistical power required (88%) and were
included in the squadron analysis.
5. The squadron listed in italics was used for the pilot study, and was therefore not
included in either the squadron analysis or the individual perception analysis.
6. A dash “--” indicates no responses were received.
6. Statistical power for Squadrons with fewer than 10 responses and an effective size of
less than 40 was not calculated, and those squadrons were eliminated from further
consideration in the squadron analysis.
7. Individual responses from all squadrons except the squadron listed in italics were used
for the individual perception analysis.
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Appendix F: Final Reliability Analysis for Each Construct Measured
Openness to Change/Innovation (I)
Task-Oriented Organizational Growth (T)
Bureaucratic (B)
Competition/Confrontation (C)
Relational Channels (R)
Partner Similarity (S)
Organizational Self-Knowledge (K)
Divergence of Interests (D)

N of Cases = 1857
N of Cases = 1857
N of Cases = 1857
N of Cases = 1857
N of Cases = 1857
N of Cases = 1857
N of Cases = 1857
N of Cases = 1857
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N of Items = 10
N of Items = 9
N of Items = 5
N of Items = 6
N of Items = 6
N of Items = 9
N of Items = 9
N of Items = 8

Alpha = .9047
Alpha = .8589
Alpha = .3575
Alpha = .6422
Alpha = .8024
Alpha = .7553
Alpha = .8954
Alpha = .8521

Appendix G: Final Factor Analysis—Rotated Component Matrix
Variable/#
B (12)
B (21)
B (4)
B (60)
B (88)
C (23)
C (50)
C (59)
C (61)
C (64)
C (78)
D (19)
D (45)
D (48)
D (51)
D (58)
D (75)
D (81)
D (89)
I (15)
I (16)
I (24)
I (28)
I (29)
I (35)
I (40)
I (44)
I (7)
I (85)
K (30)
K (34)
K (37
K (41)
K (47)
K (49)
K (57)
K (67)
K (73)
R (2)
R (66)
R (68)
R (76)
R (79)
R (83)
S (1)
S (14)
S (26)
S (27)
S (43)
S (5)
S (53)
S (74)
S (87)
T (10)
T (17)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
.754

.624
-.544

.392
.683
.362

-.475
-.535

.374
.620
.727
.597

-.597
-.791
-.468
-.717
-.429
-.574
-.558
-.482
.650
.653
.729
.455
.684
.655
.628
.701
.723
.635
.489
.623
.684
.454
.375
.479
.519
.584
.631
.735

-.552
-.462

-.359

.515
.360

.378
.417
.386
.554
.397
.462
.359

.436
.498
.376
.371

.607
.366

.563
.648
.538

.444
.849
.608
.702
.764
.436
.867
.386
.377

.396

.435
.463
.504

.354
.438

.420
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T (18)
T (25)
T (56)
T (6)
T (63)
T (8)
T (80)

.489
.439
.653
.731
.604
.595
.683

.368

.438

Explanation of Appendix G:
7. The constructs abbreviations are defined as follows:
I: Openness to Change/Innovation
T: Task-Oriented Organizational Growth
B: Bureaucratic
C: Competition/Confrontation
R: Relational Channels
S: Partner Similarity
K: Organizational Self-Knowledge
D: Divergence of Interests
8. In parenthesis next to each construct abbreviation is the number of the question.
9. Loadings are shown with boxes. In some cases, a group of questions loaded on more
than one factor.
10. Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
11. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 20
iterations.
12. Cutoff for factor loadings: .35. (Note, this partially or completely eliminated the
loadings for some factors and questions.)
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Appendix H: Example of Means Test for Male/Female Demographic
One-way Analysis of Average Openness to Change/Innovation by Gender
Means for One-way ANOVA
Level
F
M

Number
382
1475

Mean
3.26099
3.30827

Std Error
0.03827
0.01948

Lower 95%
3.1859
3.2701

Upper 95%
3.3361
3.3465

Means Comparisons (Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly
different)
Dif=Mean[i]- Mean[j]
M
F

M
0.000000
-0.04728

F
0.047276
0.000000

Alpha=0.05

One-way Analysis of Average Task-Oriented Organizational Growth by Gender
Means for One-way ANOVA
Level
F
M

Number
382
1475

Mean
3.31618
3.35594

Std Error
0.03407
0.01734

Lower 95%
3.2494
3.3219

Upper 95%
3.3830
3.3899

Means Comparisons (Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly
different)
Dif=Mean[i]- Mean[j]
M
F

M
0.000000
-0.03977

F
0.039769
0.000000

Alpha=0.05

One-way Analysis of Average Bureaucratic by Gender
Means for One-way ANOVA
Level
F
M

Number
382
1475

Mean
2.83351
2.88651

Std Error
0.02809
0.01430

Lower 95%
2.7784
2.8585

Upper 95%
2.8886
2.9145

Means Comparisons (Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly
different)
Dif=Mean[i]- Mean[j]
M
F

M
0.000000
-0.053

F
0.053001
0.000000

Alpha=0.05

One-way Analysis of Average Competition/Confrontation by Gender
Means for One-way ANOVA
Level
F
M

Number
382
1475

Mean
2.91668
2.95163

Std Error
0.02986
0.01520

Lower 95%
2.8581
2.9218

Upper 95%
2.9752
2.9814

Means Comparisons (Positive values sho w pairs of means that are significantly
different)
Dif=Mean[i]- Mean[j]
M
F

M
0.000000
-0.03496

F
0.034956
0.000000

Alpha=0.05
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One-way Analysis of Average Relational Channels by Gender
Means for One-way ANOVA
Level
F
M

Number
382
1475

Mean
3.40925
3.49412

Std Error
0.03640
0.01853

Lower 95%
3.3379
3.4578

Upper 95%
3.4806
3.5305

Means Comparisons (Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly
different)
Dif=Mean[i]- Mean[j]
M
F

M
0.000000
-0.08487

F
0.084871
0.000000

Alpha=0.05

One-way Analysis of Average Partner Similarity by Gender
Means for One-way ANOVA
Level
F
M

Number
382
1475

Mean
2.85951
2.97462

Std Error
0.03372
0.01716

Lower 95%
2.7934
2.9410

Upper 95%
2.9256
3.0083

Means Comparisons (Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly
different)
Dif=Mean[i]- Mean[j]
M
F

M
0.000000
-0.11511

F
0.115114
0.000000

Alpha=0.05

One-way Analysis of Average Organizational Knowledge by Gender
Means for One-way ANOVA
Level
F
M

Number
382
1475

Mean
3.30109
3.41516

Std Error
0.03741
0.01904

Lower 95%
3.2277
3.3778

Upper 95%
3.3745
3.4525

Means Comparisons (Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly
different)
Dif=Mean[i]- Mean[j]
M
F

M
0.000000
-0.11407

F
0.114066
0.000000

Alpha=0.05

One-way Analysis of Average Divergence of Interests by Gender
Means for One-way ANOVA
Level
F
M

Number
382
1475

Mean
2.56577
2.49958

Std Error
0.03481
0.01772

Lower 95%
2.4975
2.4648

Upper 95%
2.6340
2.5343

Means Comparisons (Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly
different)
Dif=Mean[i]- Mean[j]
F
M

F
0.000000
-0.0662

M
0.066196
0.000000

Alpha=0.05
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